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Abstract 
The economic effects from labor market integration are crucially affected by the extent to which countries 
are open to trade. In this paper we build a multi-country dynamic general equi- librium model with trade in 
goods and labor mobility across countries to study and quantify the economic effects of trade and labor 
market integration. In our model trade is costly and features households of different skills and nationalities 
facing costly forward-looking relocation decisions. We use the EU Labour Force Survey to construct 
migration flows by skill and na- tionality across 17 countries for the period 2002-2007. We then exploit the 
timing variation of the 2004 EU enlargement to estimate the elasticity of migration flows to labor mobility 
costs, and to identify the change in labor mobility costs associated to the actual change in policy. We apply 
our model and use these estimates, as well as the observed changes in tariffs, to quantify the effects from 
the EU enlargement. We find that new member state countries are the largest winners from the EU 
enlargement, and in particular unskilled labor. We find smaller welfare gains for EU-15 countries. 
However, in the absence of changes to trade policy, the EU-15 would have been worse off after the 
enlargement. We study even further the interaction effects between trade and migration policies and the 
role of different mechanisms in shaping our results. Our results highlight the importance of trade for the 
quantification of the welfare and migration effects from labor market integration. 
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1 Introduction
The aggregate and distributional consequences of economic integration are a central theme of debate
in many countries, especially regarding the effects of trade and labor market integration. In this
context, economic research has made considerable advances on the quantification and understanding
of the gains from economic integration, but most of the focus has been on the goods market.
However, less attention has been devoted to quantifying the economic effects of labor market
integration and, in particular, the effects of changes in migration policy and their interaction with
trade in goods and with trade policy, despite the fact that the largest trade agreements signed in
the world include specific commitments to labor markets integration.1
In this paper we build a quantitative multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model with
costly trade in goods and labor mobility across countries subject to migration restrictions to study
the effects of trade and labor market integration. We use the 2004 EU enlargement as a natural
experiment and exploit the time variation in the integration process to identify the changes to
migration costs associated to the change in policy. With the model and our estimates we quantify
the general equilibrium effects from actual changes to migration and trade policies.
The model features households of different skills and nationality with forward-looking relocation
decisions. In each period, households consume and supply labor in a given country and decide
whether to relocate in the next period to a different country or not. The decision to migrate
depends on the households location, nationality, skill, migration costs that are affected by policy,
and an idiosyncratic shock a` la Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010).2 Taking into account
the dynamic decision of households on where and when to migrate is particularly important in
the context of the EU enlargement since countries reduced migration restrictions sequentially over
time. Moreover, it turns out that the possibility to move in the future to another country whose
real wages have increased adds to the welfare of a worker by raising her option value of being in a
given location.3
The production side of the economy features producers of differentiated varieties in each country
with heterogeneous technology as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). In addition, we allow technology
levels to be proportional to the size of the economy in order to capture the idea that there are
benefits from firms and people locating next to each other.4 Production requires skilled and un-
1Trade agreements usually include commitments to labor market integration in multiple forms: direct labor market
provisions aimed at regulating and integrating the labor market of signatory countries, visa and asylum provisions,
and provisions liberalizing the flows of workers delivering services across countries (GATS mode IV). Besides the
EU enlargements, examples of trade agreements that include elements of labor market integration are NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, US with Australia, Chile, Singapore, the EU and Japan with Mexico, among many (WTO 2013).
2Keeping track of each household’s nationality is relevant in the context of changes to migration policies. For
instance, if U.K. eliminates migration restrictions to Polish nationals, Polish households can freely move to the U.K.
regardless of the location they are currently residing in. Likewise, unless EU countries drop migration restrictions to
Polish nationals, Polish nationals can’t migrate from the U.K. to another EU country as British nationals can.
3In fact, even if migrants and natives obtain the same real wage they value each location differently since they
face different continuation values as a result of different migration costs.
4In this sense, we follow Krugman (1980), Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), Eaton and Kortum (2001), and Ramondo,
Rodr´ıguez-Clare, and Sabor´ıo-Rodr´ıguez (2016).
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skilled labor. Firms also demand local fixed factors (structures, land) and, as a result, increases in
population size put upward pressure on factor prices that can mitigate the benefits from having a
larger market. Goods are traded across countries subject to trade costs which depend on geographic
barriers and trade policy (tariffs) as in Caliendo and Parro (2015). As a consequence, a change to
trade policy impacts the terms of trade which in turn influences the effect of a change to migration
restrictions. All these features shape the economic effects of trade and labor market integration.
Understanding the overall contribution of these channels is a quantitative question that we answer
in the context of an actual change in policy.
We apply our framework to quantify the welfare and migration effects of the 2004 EU enlarge-
ment. The 2004 EU enlargement is an agreement between member states of the European Union
(EU) and New Member States (NMS) that includes both goods market integration, and factors
market integration. On the integration in the goods market, tariffs were reduced to zero starting in
2004, and the NMS countries resigned to previous FTAs and joined EU’s FTAs. On factors market
integration, migration restrictions were eliminated although, as described in detail later on, the
timing of these changes to migration policies varied across countries.
Evaluating the effects of the EU enlargement requires information on how trade and migration
costs changed due to the policy. For the case of trade policy one can directly observe the change
in tariffs; however, changes in migration restrictions are not directly observed. To identify the
changes in migration costs due to the change in policy, we exploit the cross-country variation in the
timing of the adoption of the new migration policy.5 Our identification strategy has a difference-in-
difference flavor, and relies on the assumption that the trend in migration costs between countries
that change migration policy and those that do not would have been the same in the absence of
the EU enlargement. We confirm our identifying assumption by running several placebo tests.
To estimate these changes in migration costs due to the EU enlargement and to compute our
model we require data on bilateral gross migration flows by nationality and skill. We use raw data
from European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) to construct these migration flows for a group of 17
EU countries for the period 2002-2007.6 To evaluate the changes to trade policy, we collect tariff
data over the period 2002-2007.
To compute the effects of the EU enlargement we also need estimates of the migration cost
elasticity, the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled workers, and the trade elasticity.
We estimate the migration elasticity by adapting to our model and application the two-step PPML
estimation approach developed by Artuc¸ and McLaren (2015), and by using data on gross migration
flows and wages across countries and over time. In order to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between low and high skilled workers we follow standard approaches (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992))
and use detailed matched employer-employee data for Portugal. We instrument the relative supply
of high to low skilled labor by using information on displaced workers that are forced to change firm
5We estimate the whole set of changes in migration costs due to the EU enlargement over the period 2002-2007.
That is, for NMS nationals that migrate from NMS countries to EU countries, for NMS nationals that migrate across
NMS countries, and for EU nationals that migrate from EU countries to NMS countries.
6We collect data up to the year 2007 in an attempt to exclude the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis.
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because of firm closure. Finally, we obtain the trade elasticity from Caliendo and Parro (2015).
Using our model, estimated changes in migration costs, observed changes in tariffs, and esti-
mated migration, trade, and substitution elasticities we proceed to our empirical analysis. We com-
pute our model using the dynamic hat algebra developed in Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2017a).
The method consists on expressing the equilibrium conditions of a counterfactual economy relative
to a baseline economy. By doing so, one can solve the model and perform counterfactual analyses
without needing to estimate the set of exogenous state variables, (hereafter referred as fundamen-
tals). In our application, we solve for a counterfactual economy where we hold trade and migration
policy unchanged relative to a baseline economy which contains the actual evolution of policies.
We first evaluate the migration effects of the EU enlargement. We find that the stock of NMS
nationals in EU-15 countries increases very gradually over time. For instance, three years after the
EU enlargement (that is, in 2007) the stock of NMS nationals in EU countries increases by 0.03%,
while ten years after the implementation, the stock raises by 0.21%. We find that in steady state,
the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.63%. Across skill groups, we find that
the EU enlargement primarily increases migration of unskilled NMS workers to EU-15 countries,
and to a much lesser extent the migration of skilled workers. We also find that migration would
have been larger in the absence of changes to trade policy. For instance, the stock of NMS unskilled
workers would have been about 145 thousands people larger in the steady state, and the stock of
skilled workers would have been about 130 thousands people larger.
Turning to the welfare effects, we find that the largest winners are the NMS countries, and in
particular the unskilled workers. Welfare of NMS unskilled workers increases 1.71%, while welfare
for skilled workers increases 1.19%. On the other hand, we find smaller welfare effects for workers in
EU countries; welfare increases 0.50% for high skilled and 0.39% for low skilled workers. However,
in the absence of changes to trade policy, the EU-15 would have been worse off.
There are heterogeneous welfare effects across countries. Overall, Poland, Hungary and Lithua-
nia are the largest winners from the EU enlargement. On aggregate all groups of countries gain.
NMS countries welfare increases by 1.65%, EU-15 countries welfare increases 0.41%, while for Eu-
rope as a whole welfare increases 0.62%.
We also study the interaction between trade and migration and find that the level of trade
integration has a quantitative impact on the welfare effects of changes to migration policy. Countries
that receive migrants gain more under costly trade than under free trade while the reverse happens
to the countries that experience an outflow of workers. For instance, welfare gains from reductions
in migration restrictions for NMS countries would have been 12% higher under free trade compared
to autarky.
We also extend our model to account for potential congestion effects from public goods. We
find that in the presence of public goods migration effects from the EU enlargement are somewhat
lower as immigration strains public goods and reduces incentives to migrate. Welfare gains are
larger in NMS countries that experience a net outflow of workers that help decongest public goods,
and smaller in EU-15 countries that experience a net inflow of workers. We also evaluate the
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quantitative importance of the mechanisms that operate in the model and find that abstracting
from trade, congestion effects, and scale effects results in a significantly different welfare evaluation
of trade and migration policies.
Our paper brings together two different but complementary elements in the analysis: on the one
hand, we use a reduced-form analysis that exploits migration policy changes to identify change in
migration costs associated to the EU enlargement; on the other hand, we use a rich dynamic general
equilibrium model that includes all the mechanisms described above to quantify the migration and
welfare effects of actual changes to trade and migration policies.
We now briefly discuss the connection of study to the literature. Our research is complemen-
tary to studies that have employed static models of trade and migration to investigate different
mechanisms in which trade and migration are interrelated. For instance, the effects of immigration
in a Ricardian model with technology differences across countries studied in Davis and Weinstein
(2002), the welfare effects of migration through remittances in di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Ortega
(2015), and crowding out effects and labor market adjustments to immigration across tradable and
non-tradable occupations in Burstein, Hanson, Tian, and Vogel (2017).
Our paper also complements studies that focus on the impact of immigration on wages and
employment of native workers, a question that has been extensively studied in the literature (e.g.
Hanson and Slaughter (2002), Hanson and Slaughter (2016); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Ottaviano
et al. (2013); Hong and Mclaren (2016); and many more).
We also build on quantitative trade literature for trade policy analysis, such as Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2014), Ossa (2014), and in particular on Caliendo and Parro (2015). We depart
from these studies by adding labor market dynamics and policy dependent mobility frictions. In
this sense, our paper relates to studies that evaluate the impact of trade shocks on labor markets,
like Artuc¸ et al. (2010); Dix-Carneiro (2014); Dix Carneiro and Kovak (2017); Cosar (2013); Cos¸ar
et al. (2016); Kondo (2013); Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), McLaren and Hakobyan (2015),
and Galle, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yi (2017). For a recent review with the advances in this literature,
see McLaren (2017).
This study relates to quantitative research where labor reallocation plays an important role in
order to analyze the spatial distribution of economic activity, such as in Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm,
and Wolf (2015), Redding and Sturm (2008), Redding (2016), Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Caliendo,
Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte (2017b), Fajgelbaum, Morales, Serrato, and Zidar (2015), Monte,
Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), Tombe and Zhu (2015).7
There is a fast-growing literature using spatial dynamic general equilibrium models that we also
contribute to. Our framework with labor market dynamics builds on Artuc¸ et al. (2010), and it is
particularly close to the general equilibrium model of trade and labor market dynamics developed
in Caliendo et al. (2017a) (hereafter CDP). CDP focus on studying the dynamic adjustments of
labor markets to a trade shock, while in this paper we focus on quantifying how counterfactual
dynamic responses to migration and trade policy change the distribution of economic activity.
7 For a review of new developments in quantitative spatial models see Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2016).
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Also, different from CDP, we bring into the analysis households of different skills and nationalities,
and policy-dependent migration costs. Other papers, notably Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014),
employ spatial dynamic models to understand how the distribution of economic activity shapes the
dynamics of local innovation and growth by determining the market size of firms.
Our paper also connects with studies that have used the EU enlargement (as and ex-ante and
ex-post evaluation) to study the economics implications of the integration (e.g. Baldwin (1995),
Baldwin et al. (1997), Dustmann and Frattini (2011), and Kennan (2017). Our approach departs
in several ways, and in particular by employing new quantitative techniques to study the general
equilibrium effects of the enlargement in a model of costly trade and migration.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main migration and
trade policy changes as a consequence of the EU enlargement. In Section 3 we develop a dynamic
model for trade and migration policy analysis. Section 4 describes the data construction and
sources needed to compute the model, the estimation of changes to migration costs due to the EU
enlargement, and the estimation of the relevant elasticities of the model. In Section 5 we compute
the migration and welfare effects from the EU enlargement and discuss the results. Finally, section
6 concludes.
2 The 2004 Enlargement of the European Union
On May 1st 2004 ten new countries with a combined population of almost 75 million officially joined
the European Union (EU) bringing the total number of member states from 15 to 25 countries
(Figure 1).8 The New Member States (NMS), are: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. In this section we highlight the features
of the 2004 enlargement that directly affect the international migration of workers within Europe
and international trade both between the enlarged set of EU members and between the EU and
the rest of the world.9
2.1 Migration Policies
The freedom of movement of workers is considered as one of the four fundamental freedoms guar-
anteed by EU law (acquis communautaire), along with the free movement of goods.10 EU law
effectively establishes the right of EU nationals to freely move to another member state, to take
up employment, and reside, as well as protects against any possible discrimination, on the basis of
8The existing EU-15 member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Spain, France,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
9Appendix A describes the steps of the EU membership process, and reports additional information on the
accessing countries.
10As effectively and concisely defined by Article 45 (ex Article 39 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the freedom of movement of workers entails “the
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment”.
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Figure 1: 2004 Enlargement of the European Union
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/db/EU25-2004_European_Union_map_...
1 of 1 6/22/16, 12:36 PM
Note: EU-15 member states in blue, NMS countries in yellow.
nationality, in employment-related matters.11
The Accession Treaty of 2003 allowed the “old” member states to temporarily restrict, for a
maximum of 7 years, the access to their labor markets to citizens from the accessing countries, with
the exception of Malta and Cyprus. These temporary restrictions were organized in three phases
according to a 2+3+2 formula. The transitional arrangements were scheduled to end irrevocably
seven years after accession, i.e. on April 30th, 2011.
We now briefly summarize the phase-in period of the accession. Appendix A presents furthers
details.
Before 2004. Workers could flow freely within the EU-15 member states but not between EU-15
and NMS as well as between NMS countries.
Phase 1. In 2004, the U.K., Ireland, and Sweden open their borders to NMS countries, which
reciprocate by opening their borders to British, Irish and Swedish citizens. All the other EU-15
countries keep applying restrictions to NMS countries, except to Cyprus and Malta. All NMS
countries decide to open their borders to EU-15 member states, except for Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia which apply reciprocal measures. NMS countries lift all restrictions among each others.
Phase 2. In 2006, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain lift restrictions on workers from NMS
countries. As a consequence, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia drop their reciprocal measures to-
wards these four member states. Slovenia and Poland dropped the reciprocal measures altogether
in 2006 and 2007, respectively, while Hungary simplified them in 2008. During phase 2, The Nether-
lands and Luxembourg (in 2007), and France (in 2008) also lift restrictions on workers from NMS
countries.
11Once a worker has been admitted to the labor market of a particular member state, community law on equal
treatment as regards remuneration, social security, other employment-related measures, and access to social and tax
advantages is valid.
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Phase 3. Belgium and Denmark opened their labor market to NMS countries in 2009, while
Austria and Germany opened their labor markets at the end of the transitional period, in 2011.
As we can see, there is considerable variation in terms of which countries open to which over
time across the phases. This variation is going to result useful for us in order to identify the changes
in migration costs due to migration policy. Yet, phase 3 of the agreement was in the middle of the
2008 great financial crisis and this can interfere with our identification of the effects of the change
in policy. As a result, in our quantitative analysis, we focus on the effects of the enlargement
accounting for the first two phase-in periods. We now briefly describe the change in trade policy.
2.2 Trade Policies
As part of the enlargement process, NMS became part of the European Union Customs Union,
and of the European common commercial policy. The average tariff rate before the enlargement
was about 4.5 percent between NMS countries, 4.0 percent from NMS to EU-15 countries, and
3.5 percent from EU-15 to NMS countries, respectively. After the accession, from 2004 on, tariffs
between all EU-25 countries are zero. Also, as a consequence of the EU enlargement process, NMS
automatically entered into the trade agreements to which the EU is a party, and forwent their own
existing agreements.12 This resulted in additional changes in trade policy for NMS. We use all
these tariff changes in our quantitative assessment later on.
3 A Dynamic Model of Trade and Labor Markets Integration
In this section, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model for trade and migration policy
analysis. The model extends that in CDP by adding households of different nationalities and skills,
and by taking into account the role of trade policy and migration policy.
The world is composed of N countries, indexed by i and j. Each country represents a competitive
labor market where a continuum of firms produce goods with heterogeneous productivities. A
fraction of goods are traded across countries, and the movement of goods is subject to trade costs.
As we will see later on, a component of trade costs is tariffs, which are affected by trade policy in
each country. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) productivities have a Fre´chet distribution with a
dispersion parameter θ which, as we will see below, is also the trade cost elasticity. Production of
goods in a given country requires skilled and unskilled labor, which are imperfect substitutes, and
fixed factors that we call structures.
In the model, time is discrete and households have perfect foresight. Households make forward-
looking labor relocation decisions subject to migration costs and idiosyncratic preferences. Each
period they decide whether to stay in the same country or to move to a different country, a decision
that depends on real wages and expected continuation values. Migration policy in each country
has an impact on migration costs, and therefore on households’ decisions.
12In Appendix A.2 and B.3 we describe the evolution of tariffs and the main trade patterns between EU-15, NMS,
and the rest of the world.
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We start by describing the problem of the households’, we then set up the production structure
in each country, and finally, we derive the market clearing conditions. After doing so, we define the
equilibrium of the model.
3.1 Households
Households are forward looking, observe the economic conditions in all countries and optimally
decided where to work. Households face costs of moving across countries and are subject to id-
iosyncratic shocks that affect their moving decision. If they begin the period in a country, they
work and earn the market wage. As described above, households in a given country are of different
nationalities that we index by n, and with different skills that we index by s.
The value of a n national of skill s in country i at time t, vin,s,t, is given by
vin,s,t = log(C
i
s,t) + max{j}Nj=1
{βE[vjn,s,t+1]−mijn,s,t + νjn,s,t},
where Cis,t is the consumption aggregator that we describe below. The term m
ij
n,s,t is the migration
cost from country i to country j at time t for a household native from country n and skill level s.
The migration cost, mijn,s,t in our model is time varying, as it can be impacted by changes to
migration policy. We assume that idiosyncratic preference shocks jn,s,t are stochastic i.i.d. of a
Type-I extreme value distribution with zero mean, and dispersion parameter ν that later on we
will refer to as the migration cost elasticity. Finally, β is the discount factor.
Using the properties of the Type-I extreme value distribution, we can solve for the expected
(expectation over ) lifetime utility of a worker of nationality n and skill s in country i, namely
V in,s,t ≡ E[vin,s,t],
V in,s,t = log
(
Cis,t
)
+ νlog
(∑N
j=1
exp(βV jn,s,t+1 −mijn,s,t)1/ν
)
. (1)
The first term in equation (1) represents the current utility of that households in country i and
the second term captures the expected value of staying in that country the next period and the
option value of migrating to a different country. Notice that the option value of migration varies
by skill and nationality, and capture the fact that households of different nationality living in the
same country face different migration restrictions.
Households supply a unit of labor inelastically, and receive a competitive nominal wage wis,t
that depends on the country of residency, and the skill level. Given this, the indirect utility of a
household with skill s in country i is given by
Cis,t =
wis,t
P it
, (2)
where P it is the local price index.
Using the properties of the extreme value distribution, we also solve for the fraction of households
9
of nationality n and skill s that migrates from country i to country j at time t, which we denote
by µijn,s,t
µijn,s,t =
exp(βV jn,s,t+1 −mijn,s,t)1/ν∑N
k=1 exp(βV
k
n,s,t+1 −mikn,s,t)1/ν
. (3)
This equation describes gross flows of migrants by nationality and skill across countries. Notice
that 1/ν captures the response of migration flows to migration costs, or in other words, the migration
cost elasticity, which is a parameter that we need to estimate.
With the initial distribution of labor by nationality and skill across countries, and the migration
flows at each period, we can solve for the evolution of labor by nationality and skill at each moment
in time. Specifically,
Lin,s,t+1 =
∑N
j=1
µjin,s,tL
j
n,s,t, for all n, s. (4)
Finally, the total labor supply in each country is then given by the sum of high-skill (h) and low-skill
(l) workers of all nationalities,
Lit =
∑N
n=1
(
Lin,h,t + L
i
n,l,t
)
.
We now turn to describe the production structure of each economy.
3.2 Production
A continuum of goods is produced in each country with technology as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
The technology to produce these goods requires both skilled and unskilled labor, and structures.
Skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes, and structures is a fixed factor. Total factor
productivity (TFP) is composed of two terms: an aggregate component (Ait), which is common to
all varieties in a country, and a variety-specific component (zi) that is a stochastic realization from
a Fre´chet distribution. We allow technology levels to be endogenous and proportional to the size of
the economy, that is Ait = φ
i
tL
i
t , as in Ramondo et al. (2016).
13 Note that, although the elasticity
of TFP with respect to population size is equal to one under this formulation, the elasticity of real
income with respect to population is less than one because of the congestion effects in the presence
of local fixed factors.14
Since each variety is identified by zi, we use it to index a variety. Therefore, the production
function of a given good in country i is given by
qit(z
i) = ziAit
((
δih
) 1
ρ
(
Lih,t
) ρ−1
ρ +
(
δil
) 1
ρ
(
Lil,t
) ρ−1
ρ
) ρ(1−γi)
ρ−1 (
H i
)γi
,
13Note that an isomorphic relation arises from models with free entry of firms as in Melitz (2003).
14Given this, the production structure of our model can be mapped into existing static models with scale effects
that show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (e.g. Kucheryavyy et al. (2016)).
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where Lih,t and L
i
l,t are the amount of high and low skilled labor used to produce a given good
in country i, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled labor, (1 − γi) is the
share of labor payments in value added, δih is the weight of high-skilled labor in production, and
δil is the weight of low-skilled labor, with δ
i
h + δ
i
l = 1. The stock of land and infrastructures is H
i,
which, as mentioned before, is a fixed factor.
We refer to rentiers as the owners of the fixed factors H i. As in Caliendo et al. (2017b) we
assume that there is a mass one of rentiers in each economy and that rentiers consume local goods
using (2), the same consumption aggregator as households. Rentiers obtain rents ritH
i from the
fixed factors they own and rent to firms. We assume that these rents are sent to a global portfolio
and that rentiers obtain a share ιi of the global portfolio revenues χt =
∑N
i=1 r
i
tH
i, where rit is
the rental price of structures in country i. Differences between remittances to the global portfolio
and the income transfers from the global portfolio will generate imbalances in each country, and
therefore, this assumption on the behavior of the rentiers will allow us, in our quantitative model,
to match the observed trade imbalances across nations.
Goods can be traded across countries subject to trade costs. Specifically the cost of shipping
goods from country j to country i is given by κijt = (1 + τ
ij
t )d
ij
t , where d
ij
t is an iceberg-type trade
cost, and τ ijt is an ad-valorem tariff.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), using the properties of the Fre´chet distribution we can solve
for the bilateral trade shares piijt and the price index P
i
t as a function of factor prices, productivities
and trade costs. Specifically,
piijt =
Ajt (κ
ij
t x
j
t )
−θ∑N
k=1A
k
t (κ
ik
t x
k
t )
−θ , (5)
P it =
(∑N
j=1A
j
t (κ
ij
t x
j
t )
−θ
)− 1
θ
, (6)
where xit is the input cost to produce one unit of output, namely
xit ≡ ζi
(
δih(w
i
h,t)
1−ρ + δil(w
i
l,t)
1−ρ) (1−γi)1−ρ (rit)γi , (7)
where ζi is a constant. We now describe the market clearing conditions and the equilibrium of the
model.
3.3 Market clearing
The total expenditure on goods by country i is given by labor income of workers of all skill levels
and nationalities residing in country i, and by local rentiers. Namely, the goods market clearing is
given by
Xit =
∑N
n=1
∑
s=h,l w
i
s,tL
i
n,s,t + ι
iχt + T
i
t , for all i, (8)
where χt =
∑N
i=1 r
i
tH
i is the rent of the global portfolio, and where T it =
∑N
j=1 τ
ij
t
piijt
(1+τ ijt )
Xit are
tariff revenues.
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Finally, the labor markets clear, i.e
wis,tL
i
s,t = ξ
i
s,t(1− γi)
∑N
j=1
pijit
(1 + τ jit )
Xjt , for all i, s, (9)
where ξis,t is the share of skill s in the labor payments, which is time varying given the CES
production structure.
3.4 Equilibrium
We denote by Θt ≡ ({dijt }, {Ait}, {H i})N,Ni=1,j=1 the set of constant and time-varying fundamentals,
where we clarify that Ait has an endogenous component as explained above. In addition, we denote
by Υt ≡ ({τ ijt }, {mijn,h,t}, {mijn,l,t})N,N,Nn=1,i=1,j=1 the different economic policies of a country: tariffs and
migration policies that impact migration costs mijn,s,t. The state of the economy is given by the
distribution of labor across each market at a given moment in time Lt =
{
Lin,h,t, L
i
n,l,t
}N,N
n=1,i=1
. We
now seek to define the equilibrium of the model given fundamentals, trade policies, and migration
policies. First, we formally define a temporary equilibrium, which is given by the set of factor prices
that solve the static trade equilibrium.
Definition 1. Given (Lt,Θt, Υt), the temporary equilibrium is a set {wih,t, wil,t, rit}Ni=1 of factor
prices that solves the static sub-problem given by the equilibrium conditions (5), (6), (7), (8), and
(9).
We denote by ωis,t ≡ wis,t/P it real income and by ωis,t(Lt,Θt, Υt) the solution of the temporary
equilibrium given (Lt,Θt, Υt). We now define the sequential competitive equilibrium of the model
given a sequence of fundamentals and policies:
Definition 2. Given an initial allocation of labor L0, a sequence of fundamentals {Θt}∞t=0, and a
sequence of policies {Υt}∞t=0, a sequential competitive equilibrium of the model is a sequence
{Ln,s,t, µn,s,t, Vn,s,t, ωis,t(Lt,Θt, Υt)}N,∞n=1,t=0 for s = {h, l}, that solves the households’ dynamic prob-
lem, equilibrium conditions (1), (3), (4), and the temporary equilibrium at each t.
Definition 2 illustrates the equilibrium of the model given an initial condition on the state of
the economy and for a given sequence of fundamentals and policies. Our goal now is to use the
model to study the trade, migration and welfare effects of changes to trade and migration policies.
We do so in the multi-country version of the model calibrated to the EU economies. Taking a
large scale model to the data requires estimating a large set of unknown parameters—technologies,
iceberg trade costs, the non-policy component of migration costs, and the endowments of fixed
factors—that we refer to as fundamentals. We use the method proposed by CDP, dynamic hat
algebra (henceforth DHA), to take the model to the data to study the effects of changes to trade
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and migration policies. The key advantage of DHA is that we can conduct our quantitative analysis
without estimating the fundamentals of the economy. We now express the equilibrium conditions
of the model in relative time differences and show how we can use the model and data to study the
effects of the EU enlargement.
3.5 Solving for Policy Changes
Suppose we want to study the effects of changes in policy from {Υt}∞t=0 → {Υ ′t}∞t=0. Let y˙t+1 ≡
yt+1/yt denote the relative time change of a variable, and let yˆt+1 ≡ y˙′t+1/y˙t+1 denote the relative
time difference of the variable under a sequence of policies {Υ ′t}∞t=0 relative to the sequence of
policies {Υt}∞t=0.
For instance, if yt+1 are prices, yˆt+1 is the relative change in prices as a consequence of the
change in policy. Given this notation we can write the equilibrium conditions of the model for
given a change in the sequence of policies. Importantly, what the next proposition shows is that,
given data on the allocations of the economy, we can study the effects of a change in policy without
information on the sequence of fundamentals. To simplify notation let mˆijn,s,t ≡ exp(m′ijn,s,t+1 −
m′ijn,s,t)/ exp(m
ij
n,s,t+1 −mijn,s,t) , and uˆin,s,t ≡ exp(V ′in,s,t+1 − V ′in,s,t)/ exp(V in,s,t+1 − V in,s,t).
Proposition 1. Given data {Lt,µt,pit,Xt}∞t=0, elasticities (ν, θ, β, ρ), and a sequence of counterfac-
tual changes in policy ˆ{Υt}
∞
t=0, solving the model does not require {Θt}∞t=0, and solves
uˆin,s,t = Cˆ
i
s,t
(∑N
j=1
µ′ijn,s,t−1µ˙
ij
n,s,t
(
mˆijn,s,t
)−1/ν (
uˆjn,s,t+1
)β/ν)ν
,
µ′ijn,s,t =
µ′ijn,s,t−1µ˙
ij
n,s,t
(
mˆijn,s,t
)−1/ν (
uˆjn,s,t+1
)β/ν
∑N
k=1 µ
′ik
n,s,t−1µ˙ikn,s,t
(
mˆikn,s,t
)−1/ν (
uˆkn,s,t+1
)β/ν ,
L′in,s,t+1 =
N∑
j=1
µ′jin,s,tL
′j
n,s,t ,
for all n, and s, where µ˙ijn,s,t is the observed (data) change in migration flows over time, and
Cˆis,t = ωˆ
i
s,t(L̂t, Υ̂t) is obtained from solving the temporary equilibrium conditions.
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The result in Proposition 1 follows directly from CDP, and shows how we can use data and
estimated elasticities to study the effects of a change in policy without needing to estimate funda-
mentals.
We apply the result of Proposition 1 as follows. Consider a sequence of observed allocations
(data) before and after the change in policy. This sequence of data contains information of the
15Appendix F describes the equilibrium conditions of the temporary equilibrium in relative time differences.
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actual fundamentals and the policies in place at each time, including the policy changes due to the
EU enlargement. To isolate the effect of the EU enlargement, we have to construct a counterfactual
sequence of allocations that reflects the evolution of the economies in the absence of the EU enlarge-
ment. Proposition 1 shows how to compute this counterfactual economy under a new sequence of
policies, Υˆt, relative to the data. For the case of the EU enlargement, the counterfactual sequence
of policies is to leave tariffs and migration costs unchanged, that is, at the pre-enlargement level.
Therefore, the solution to the equilibrium conditions in relative time differences showed in Propo-
sition 1 answers the following question: “How would the economy look like if everything would
have happened as in the data (changes in fundamentals, other policies, etc.) except for the EU
enlargement?” We can apply the result in Proposition 1 to study any other counterfactual change
in policy and/or to study changes in fundamentals. Of course, this requires the use of time series
data on labor allocations, migration and trade flows, and expenditures, as well as estimates of the
elasticities.16 Implementing this methodology requires a measure of the changes in policies that
we want to study. While the magnitude of changes in tariffs comes immediately from the data,
measuring the change in migration costs associated with the EU enlargement is challenging.
In the next section, we describe how we construct the data to compute the model, we present
the estimation strategy used to measure the changes in migration costs, and we estimate all the
relevant elasticities.
4 Calibration and Estimation
To implement the DHA described in the previous section, we need data on bilateral migration
shares by nationality and skill µijn,s,t, bilateral trade shares pi
ij
t , total expenditure by country X
i
t ,
and the distribution of labor by nationality and skill across countries Lin,s,t. In addition, we need
to compute the share of labor payments in value added (1− γi) and the share of labor by skill ξis,t.
We also need estimates of the migration cost elasticity 1/ν, and an estimate of the elasticity of
substitution between low and high skill workers, ρ. We also need to input a value for the trade cost
elasticity θ, and for the discount factor β. In our quantitative analysis we use the value θ = 4.5
from Caliendo and Parro (2015), and a yearly discount factor β = 0.97. To evaluate the change
in trade and migration policy we also need bilateral ad-valorem tariffs τ ijt , and the changes in
migration costs associated to the policy for each country pair. In this section we describe the data
construction, and estimation strategies to obtain the elasticities and changes in migration costs
associated to the EU enlargement. Appendix B, C, and D present a more extensive description of
the data and the estimation methodologies.
16In practice, there is no infinite sequence of data. To overcome this, we follow CDP and use the maximum possible
data available and then use the model to solve forward for the economy under a constant set of fundamentals and
policies. In our application this would mean to use data from the years 2002 to 2007 and then solve forward with the
level of fundamentals and policies implied by the data of the year 2007.
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4.1 Gross Migration Flows by Skill and Nationality
A limitation to the understanding of the impact of migration flows on economic outcomes lies in the
scarce availability of harmonized cross-country data on migration flows. In this section we describe
the construction of bilateral gross migration flows across European countries.
We construct a comprehensive data set on bilateral gross migration flows for European countries
from 2002 to 2007 using information contained in the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), a
large household survey providing confidential quarterly or annual results on labor participation of
people aged 15 and over, as well as on persons outside the labor force from 1983 onward. The EU-
LFS is currently conducted in the 28 member states of the European Union, two candidate countries
and three countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).17 The main strength of the
EU-LFS is to use the same concepts and definitions in every country, follow International Labour
Organization guidelines using common classifications (NACE, ISCO, ISCED, NUTS), and record
the same set of characteristics in each country. Because of these features, the EU-LFS is the basis
for unemployment and education statistics in Europe.
The survey contains information on a representative sample of the labor force in each country.
Individuals are assigned a weight to represent the share of people with the same characteristics in
the country. For each individual in a specific year, we have information on age, nationality, skills
and, crucially for our purpose, country of residence 12 months before. We use the information
on country of residence in the previous year to construct bilateral gross migration flows by year,
country of origin, nationality and skill for a group of 17 EU countries.18
We group migrants in three broad nationality categories that follow immediately from the 2004
European enlargement: EU-15 nationals, NMS nationals, and Other nationals (rest of the world).
Moreover, we follow the international standard classification of education (ISCED 1997) and define
high skill labor as college educated and low skill labor as individuals with high school degree or
less. We constraint our sample to include only individuals of working age—between 15 and 65 years
old—and only countries with consistent information on nationality, skills and country of origin over
the period 2002-2007. We end up with a total of 17 countries, ten former EU members, Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom,
and seven NMS, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. Our
group of countries covers 91 percent of the 2004 EU-25 population.19
As an illustration, Figure 2 plots the gross flows and stocks of NMS migrants in EU15 countries
17The national statistical institute of each country in Europe conducts surveys that are centrally processed by
Eurostat; each national institute is responsible for selecting the sample, preparing the questionnaires, conducting the
direct interviews among households, and forwarding the results to Eurostat in accordance with the requirements of
the regulation.
18As an example, looking at the U.K. survey in 2004, we know if a Polish high-skilled worker moved to the U.K.
from Poland in the previous 12 months. Migration shares, µijn,s,t are computed as the share of migrants that moved
to a specific destination country over a population defined by country of origin, nationality and skills.
19Country surveys for Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Romania
and Finland do not contain sufficient information to compute migration flows consistently between 2002 and 2007,
so we assign these countries to the rest of the world (RoW). More information on each case is contained in Appendix
B.1.
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Figure 2: Migration flows and stocks of NMS nationals in the EU-15, 2002-2007
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Note: Own elaboration using the data set on gross migration flows described in Section 4 and Appendix B.2. Migration
flows includes 10 EU-15 countries and 7 NMS countries. EU-15 and NMS nationalities are defined in Section 4 and
Appendix B.2.2 and cover all the EU-25 members. High-skill includes all individuals with at least tertiary education,
while low skills include the residual workers with education up to post secondary non-tertiary education (see Appendix
B.2.3).
that arise from our constructed gross migration flows data.20 As we can see from the panels, the
largest fraction of migrants was unskilled.
4.2 Trade, Employment, Production, Consumption
We construct the bilateral trade shares piijt for the 17 countries in our sample, and a constructed
rest of the world, using trade flows from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), and we also
compute total expenditure by country Xit from WIOD. Employment Ln,s,t is computed using the
stocks of workers by country, nationality, skills and year from the EU-LFS. The share of labor
payments in value added (1 − γi) is computed with information on labor compensation retrieved
from the socio economic accounts of the WIOD. The share of labor by skill ξis,t in total labor
payment is obtained using labor compensation data by skill from the socio economic account of the
20Appendix describes in greater detail how we construct the gross migration flows, and provides a set of external
validation statistics.
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WIOD data set.
4.3 Identifying Changes in Migration and Trade Costs due to the EU Enlarge-
ment
In this section we present our strategy to measure the changes in migration costs due to the EU
enlargement for each pair of countries in our sample. As we described in Section 2.1, the elimination
of migration restrictions was implemented at different points in time for different pairs of countries.
The main changes in migration policy over the period 2002-2007 were the United Kingdom opening
to NMS countries in 2004, followed by Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal in 2006, and NMS countries
opening their respective labor markets to each other in 2004. Therefore this is the set of changes
in migration costs that we are going to estimate in what follows.
Our strategy employs a difference-in-difference approach based on the migration shares equi-
librium equation (3). Define yijn,s,t ≡ logµijn,s,t, then the log odds of the probability of migrating
from country i to country j with respect to the probability of staying in country i for workers of
nationality n and skill s is given by
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t = −
1
ν
(
mijn,s,t −miin,s,t
)
+
β
ν
V jn,s,t+1 −
β
ν
V in,s,t+1. (10)
Intuitively, the log odds are decreasing in the cost of migrating from i to j relative to the cost of
staying in i, and increasing in the value of living in j compared to the value of living in country i.
Equation (10) provides therefore a natural starting point to measure the change in relative migration
costs from country i to j between two time periods; a decrease in migration costs, controlling for
the change in the relative value of living in j, would result in an increase in the ratio of migrants
to stayers.
Our goal is to identify the change in migration costs,
(
mijn,post −mijn,pre
)
, between the period
preceding (pre) and following (post) the migration policy change. In order to control for destination-
nationality-skill-time and origin-nationality-skill-time factors, we estimate equation (10) in a dif-
ference in difference fashion, and capture the value terms with origin-nationality-skill-time and
destination-nationality-skill-time fixed effects. 21
Example: Change in the Migration Costs from NMS to the UK
To explain our identification strategy, we start by describing the estimation of the change in the cost
of migrating from NMS to the U.K. We then follow with the rest of changes to migration policy.
In the case of the U.K. we consider three sets of gross migration flows: from NMS countries to
the U.K., our treated group in the difference-in-difference jargon; from NMS countries to Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany (EU-5), our first control group, that corresponds to a
21The decision to open could, in fact, be affected by the current stock or the recent inflows of immigrants in the
country, or by the political orientation of the government. We control for these, and other, possibilities through the
destination-skill-time fixed effects. Similarly, the economic situation in the NMS countries, as well as other push
migration factors, are accounted for by the origin-skill-time fixed effects.
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set of EU countries that did not open their labor market to NMS countries before 2008; and from
EU-5 to the U.K., the second control group. For each nationality n, we pool the flows of low and
high skilled workers, and separately estimate the following model:
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Odds of migrating to U.K. vs. staying
= δU.K.n,s,t In,s,t (j = U.K.)︸ ︷︷ ︸
U.K. destination-skill FE
+
∑
o∈NMS
αon,s,tIn,s,t (i = o)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Set of origin-skill FE
+
+βU.K.n
∑
o∈NMS
In,s,t (j = U.K., i = o)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Set of U.K.-origin-skill FE
+
+βU.K.n,post
∑
o∈NMS
In,s,t (j = U.K., i = o, t ∈ post)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Set of U.K.-origin-skill FE * post2003
+εijn,s,t,
(11)
where I (.) is an indicator function, δU.K.n,s,t represents the coefficients of a set of year-skill dummies
for when the destination is the U.K., αon,s,t represents the coefficients of a set of year-skill dummies
for each source NMS country, βU.K.n is the coefficient of a dummy for when the origin is an NMS
country and the destination is the U.K., and βU.K.n,post is the coefficient of a dummy for when the
origin is an NMS country, the destination is the U.K., and t belongs to the post 2003 period.22
Finally, εijn,s,t is a random disturbance of relative migration costs and it is assumed to be orthogonal
to changes in migration policy.
The coefficient βU.K.n,post is then our main coefficient of interest, representing the change in mi-
gration costs between the pre- and post-enlargement periods, normalized by the opposite of the
migration elasticity (−1/ν), i.e.
βU.K.n,post ≡ −
1
ν
(
mijn,s,post −mijn,s,pre
)
. (12)
In other words, given an estimate of the migration elasticity, βU.K.n,post provides an estimate of the
average change in the cost of migrating from NMS countries to the U.K. due to the enlargement
process, after controlling for any destination-skill-nationality-time and origin-skill-nationality-time
confounding factors.23
Note the importance of using three sets of gross flows, from NMS to the U.K., from NMS to
EU-5 countries, and from EU-5 countries to the U.K., in order to identify destination-nationality-
skill-time and origin-nationality-skill-time fixed effects.24 The coefficient βU.K.n,post is then the sum of
22Note that the origin-nationality-skill-time fixed effects αon,s,t also control for changes in the cost of staying in
country o for a s-skilled n national.
23Note that one could have estimated a coefficient across NMS origin countries and skills. Instead, we constrained
the point estimate to be equal across skill groups. This does not mean that the migration costs are the same for
different skill groups, it only means that the change in policy was proportionally equal across different skill groups.
24Given that we are aggregating data at the origin-destination-year level for a given nationality we account for
possible random effects common to all individuals migrating from the same origin country to the same destination
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Table 1: Estimates of Changes in Migration Costs, NMS nationals and EU nationals
NMS nationals
Destination j → U.K. (2004) GR (2006) IT (2006) ES (2006) PT (2006)
βjn,post
3.52***
(1.11)
2.29**
(0.83)
1.01*
(0.55)
0.18
(0.54)
1.01***
(0.49)
R2 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
Obs. 564 564 564 564 564
Placebo: EU nationals
Destination j → U.K. (2004) GR (2006) IT (2006) ES (2006) PT (2006)
βjn,post
0.74
(1.40)
−0.08
(1.52)
−0.02
(1.35)
0.46
(1.34)
−1.22
(1.45)
R2 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90
Obs. 564 564 564 564 564
Notes: The table reports difference-in-difference estimates, from separate regressions, of the change in migration
cost from NMS countries to either the United Kingdom (U.K.), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), or Portugal
(PT) for NMS nationals (top panel) or EU-15 nationals (bottom panel). Recall, from equation (12), that a positive
estimate implies a reduction in migration costs. The bottom panel represents a placebo exercise since no migration
policy changes occurred for EU-15 nationals. The treatment period (post) is 2004-2007 for the U.K., and 2006-2007
for the other destinations. Parentheses includes robust standard errors, ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10. Similar
significance is obtained if instead we use two-way clustering at the origin-destination-country level.
three components: the average change in the cost of migrating from NMS countries to the U.K., our
target, minus both the change in the cost of migrating from NMS countries to EU-5 countries and
the change in the cost of migrating from EU-5 countries to the U.K. for NMS nationals. We exploit
the fact that (i) EU-5 countries did not open their labor markets to NMS countries in the sample
period (which justifies choosing EU-5 as the control group), and (ii) those NMS nationals residing
in EU-5 before the EU enlargement did not experience changes in migration costs associated to
the EU enlargement.25 Appendix C.1 and C.2 provide support for the common trend assumption
underlying the difference-in-difference strategy.
Change in the Migration Costs from NMS to U.K, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal
The top panel of table 1 presents our estimates of the changes in migration costs for the case of
NMS nationals moving from NMS countries to the U.K, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. As
we can see, all estimates are positive and significant (except for Spain), pointing to a reduction
country in the same year.
25One reason why this is the case is that NMS nationals already legally working in one of the old member states at
the date of accession for an uninterrupted period of at least 12 months continue to have access to the labor market
of that member state. NMS nationals who had in 2004 legally worked in e.g. Germany for at least 12 months could
keep working there even if the German labor market was not generally open to NMS nationals.
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in the cost of migrating from NMS to Europe for NMS nationals both in 2004 and 2006.26 These
coefficients are hard to interpret since they reflect the change in the migration cost scaled by the
migration elasticity and measured in units of utility. To understand the magnitude, in terms of
consumption, real wages, etc., of these changes we need to use these estimates as inputs in our
quantitative model.
Placebo Experiments
To support our identification strategy we also run placebo experiments. The intuition is that we
expect the costs of migrating from NMS countries to the U.K, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal
not to have changed for EU-15 nationals as a consequence of the EU enlargement. The bottom
panel of table 1 reports these estimates, and reassuringly shows no change in the migration costs
due to the enlargement from NMS to Europe for those that already were European citizens.
Change in the Migration Costs from NMS to NMS
We now consider the other main changes in migration policy: NMS countries opening their respec-
tive labor markets to each other. In these cases we cannot apply anymore the difference-in-difference
methodology since, because of data limitations, there is no control group we can exploit.27 There-
fore, to estimate this set of migration costs we proceed in an alternative way. Taking the product
between the ratio of migrants to stayers in one direction and in the opposite direction, we can
differentiate the value functions, and the resulting ratio will only contain information on migration
frictions.28 Taking logs, we get
(
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t
)
+
(
yjin,s,t − yjjn,s,t
)
= −1
ν
((
mijn,s,t −miin,s,t
)
+
(
mjin,s,t −mjjn,s,t
))
.
With this measure we can only estimate a combination of migration costs in one direction and
in the opposite direction, and therefore we need to impose more structure to separate them. In
particular, we assume the change in migration costs to be symmetric, and to be the same for each
pair of NMS countries. We then regress the measure of migration frictions on a constant and a
dummy variable for the post-enlargement period,(
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t
)
+
(
yjin,s,t − yjjn,s,t
)
= α+ βpostI
ij
n,s,t (t ∈ post) + εijn,s,t,
where I (.) is an indicator function and post represents the post 2003 period. Then, βpost captures
the average change, between the pre- and post-enlargement period, of the migration frictions.29
26Recall, from equation (12), that a positive estimate implies a reduction in migration costs.
27Bulgaria and Romania, which could have potentially been an alternative control group, have limited information
on nationality.
28In the international trade literature this ratio is known as the Head and Ries index, and it is used to identify
trade frictions.
29We also used the same strategy in order to identify the changes in costs of migrating to NMS for EU nationals.
For this case we used the flows of EU nationals from the EU to NMS before and after the change in policy. Given that
there where not many flows over our sample period and no significant variation in the flows we ended up obtaining
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Table 2: Changes in Migration Costs, NMS to NMS
NMS nationals
βpost 1.71∗∗∗
(0.49)
R2 0.99
Obs. 252
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, robust standard errors
Table 2 reports the results, and shows a reduction in the cost of migrating from NMS to NMS
countries, for NMS nationals, in 2004.
Change in Trade Policy
Finally, we employ bilateral tariffs τ ijt between each pair of countries, using information from the
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data set, to capture changes in trade costs due to the EU
enlargement. We use effectively applied rates and we combine information from two different data
sets, the TRAINS data set and the WTO data set, to have complete and consistent information on
tariffs over time.30
Armed with this set of estimates of the changes in trade and migration costs associated with
the the EU enlargement , we now proceed to estimate the necessary elasticities for our quantitative
analysis.
4.4 International Migration Elasticity
The migration elasticity is a key parameter to evaluate the welfare effects associated to changes
in the barriers to migrate: welfare effects depend on the magnitude of the change in barriers, and
on how sensitive the decision to migrate is to the barriers themselves. Artuc¸ et al. (2010) and
CDP, provide estimates of the elasticities for internal migration flows, while here we deal with
international migration. We therefore adapt the methodology of Artuc¸ and McLaren (2015) to the
structure of our model, and apply it to the flows of EU national within the EU, to provide a value
for the international migration elasticity.31
The first stage of the methodology is a fixed-effect estimation that uses the migration share
equation (3) and bilateral gross migration flows data to estimate value differences and the migration
cost function normalized by ν. The second stage of the methodology relies on the Bellman equation.
We insert the estimated value differences from the first stage into the Bellman equation, and
construct a linear regression to retrieve the international migration elasticity by exploiting the
variation in real wages. We estimate the second stage model as an IV regression, using two-period
not economically significant estimates for this case.
30In Appendix B.3.1 we explain in detail how we construct the bilateral tariff data for each country pair.
31We describe in detail the implementation of the methodology and report the results, both for the baseline case
and for the extension with public good described later, in Appendix D.
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lagged values of real wages as instruments, and clustering standard errors at the country level.32
In our preferred specification with β = 0.97 we obtain an elasticity of 0.44—significant at 1
percent—which implies a value of ν of 2.3. This is the value that we use when performing our
quantitative analysis.
4.5 Elasticity of Substitution Between Low and High Skilled Workers
In this section, we provide an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled
workers. Following the literature, low-skilled workers include workers with a high-school degree or
less, and high-skilled workers are workers with some college education and college graduates. We
estimate the elasticity of substitution using detailed information on workers’ wages and hours, as
well as firms’ location and industry, from the Portuguese matched employer-employee data (Quadros
de Pessoal) for the period 1991-2008.33 Our estimation strategy builds on standard approaches (e.g.
Katz and Murphy (1992)), but we instrument the endogeneity of the relative supply of high to low
skilled workers. We estimate the following econometric model based on the equilibrium conditions
of the theory laid out in Section 3,
ln
wvrh,t
wvrl,t
= −1
ρ
ln
Lvrh,t
Lvrl,t
+ αvr + εvrt , (13)
where
(
wvrh,t/w
vr
l,t
)
is the ratio of high- and low-skilled workers’ wages in industry v and region r (in
Portugal),
(
Lvrh,t/L
vr
l,t
)
is the corresponding relative supply, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution
between low and high skilled workers. Finally, we have written the relative weight of high- and
low-skilled workers (1/ρ) ln (δvrh /δ
vr
l ) as the sum of an industry-region fixed effect and a residual
industry-region-time effect αvr + εvrt .
The main difficulty faced by researchers in this area is that the relative number of more educated
workers and their relative wages are determined simultaneously by demand and supply. Because of
that, the relative supply term
(
Lvrh,t/L
vr
l,t
)
in equation (13) could be correlated with industry-region
demand shocks (εvrt ), making it difficult to identify the elasticity of substitution via OLS. We tackle
this issue using instrumental variable estimation. Our instrument for
(
Lvrh,t/L
vr
l,t
)
is constructed
32We emphasize three merits of the Artuc¸ and McLaren (2015) methodology: First, the estimation strategy does
not require taking logarithm of probabilities. Given that most of the migration shares are very small this is an
important feature that avoids causing large errors and imprecise estimates, and allows us to work with 17 countries.
Second, we can be agnostic about exactly what information workers have when they form their expectations of future
wages, and only assume that forecast errors are mean zero conditional on contemporaneous information. Third,
we impose only a mild assumption on bilateral migration costs: we assume that migration costs for EU nationals
flowing across EU-15 member states did not vary over time and skills. Note, however, that we can still let the cost
of migrating out of country i, and into country j, be skill-dependent.
33We resort to Quadros de Pessoal for a number of reasons. First, Quadros de Pessoal’s provides an exhaustive
coverage of firms and their workers over a long time-span. Second, we can estimate an elasticity of substitution
between low and high-skill workers that is consistent with the skills definitions from the EU-LFS. Third, we can
estimate an elasticity of substitution using data from an European country, and we can compare our findings to other
estimates available in the literature for other countries. Last but not least, we can exploit the richness of the data
to implement an instrumental variable strategy, described below, that facilitates the identification of the elasticity of
substitution.
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using information on the local availability of low- and high-skilled workers that change firm because
of displacement, and in particular because of firm closure.34 A firm closure can be considered as
an exogenous shock to a worker’s career, since it results in a separation of all plant’s workers and
it is not related to the worker’s own job performance (Dustmann and Meghir (2005)). Moreover,
when instrumenting the relative labor supply of a given industry, we consider only closures of firms
that belong to other industries, so that their closure is hardly related to the market of the industry
under consideration. Finally, as workers tend to search and accept more easily new jobs in the same
local labor market of the past job, we consider closures of firms that belong to the same region
of the industry under consideration. Overall, the local availability of displaced workers can then
be considered as an exogenous labor supply shock for local firms. Figure 3 shows the correlation
between the instrumented variable and the instrument.
Figure 3: Relative supply of high-skilled workers and displaced high-skilled workers, by industry
and region, 1992-2005
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Note: Own elaboration using the matched employer-employee data set Quadros de Pessoal described in Section B.5
and Appendix E. Low-skill includes all workers with a high-school degree or less, and high-skilled are workers with
some college education and college graduates. Each circle in the plot corresponds to an industry-region-year, where
regions are approximately NUTS II (5 regions), and industries are NACE 1-digit. The dashed line corresponds to
the predicted values of a linear OLS model, with slope of 0.53 (with standard error 0.050) and R2 equal to 0.39.
Employing the methodology and data outlined above (and described more in detail in Appendix
E), we obtain an elasticity of 4, which is the number we use in our quantitative analysis. The
estimate of the elasticity of substitution is pretty robust to alternative different specifications,
methodologies, and levels of data aggregation (Appendix E). Our estimate is slightly above those
commonly found for the U.S. (Katz and Murphy (1992); Johnson (1997); Krusell et al. (2000);
Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Ciccone and Peri (2005)) which range between 1.5 and 2.5, but below
the elasticity of substitution of 5 between low- and medium-skilled workers found for Germany
(Dustmann et al. (2009)). Since the set of European countries we consider in the quantitative
analysis is pretty diverse in terms of labor market institutions and workforce characteristics we
34Displacement is usually defined as the permanent and involuntary separation of workers from their jobs without
cause (i.e. for economic reasons). Displacement occurs when a firm shuts down or substantially downsizes.
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consider our benchmark estimate of 4 as a good compromise.35
5 Economic Effects of the 2004 EU Enlargement
In this section, we use the estimated changes in migration costs, and the observed changes in
tariffs, to quantify the migration and welfare effects of the EU enlargement. We first compute the
migration effects from the actual changes to migration and trade policies over the period 2002-2007,
and we then quantify the welfare effects. We also use our model to study the interaction between
trade openness and migration policy, and to decompose the role of the different mechanisms of the
model in shaping the welfare effects.
5.1 Migration Effects
We start by quantifying the migration effects from the EU enlargement. In particular, with our
structural model we want to answer questions such as: How did the stock of new member states
(NMS) migrants in EU-15 countries respond to the EU enlargement? Was NMS migration gradual
or a once for all process? What was the change in the stock of NMS migrants in EU-15 countries
across skill groups, and in the short and long run? What would have been the migration effects in
the absence of changes to trade policy?
To compute the migration effects, we feed into our structural model the estimated changes
in migration costs and the observed changes in tariffs over 2002-2007, and compute the change
migration effects compared with an economy where migration and trade policies stayed unchanged.
Figure 4 displays the evolution of the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries (for all workers and
by skill). The darker line shows the evolution of the stock in the baseline economy with the actual
changes to migration and trade policy between 2002-2007. The dashed line shows the evolution
of the stock of NMS nationals in the counterfactual economy, where we hold migration costs and
tariffs constant at the levels before the EU enlargement. Therefore, the difference between the two
lines is the migration effects from the EU enlargement. From the figure, panel a, we can see a very
gradual increase in the stock of NMS migrants in EU-15 countries. For instance, three years after
the EU enlargement (that is, in 2007) the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases
by 0.03%, while ten years after the implementation, the stock raises by 0.21%. We find that in
steady state, the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.63% . Across individual
countries, we find that the United Kingdom is the country that experienced the largest increase in
the stock of NMS nationals.
35Many papers estimating the elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled workers do not consider
endogeneity issues. Two important exceptions are Angrist (1995) and Ciccone and Peri (2005). Angrist (1995)
estimate the relationship between the return to schooling and the supply of more educated workers among Palestinians
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the 1980s, exploiting the fact that the increase in the supply of more
educated workers was mainly driven by the creation of new local institutions of higher education. Ciccone and Peri
(2005) estimate the long-run elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled workers at the U.S. state level
using data from five 1950-1990 decennial censuses. They exploit time- and state-specific child labor and compulsory
school attendance laws as instruments.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the stock of NMS migrants in EU15 countries (percent)
Notes: This figure presents the stock of NMS migrants in EU-15 countries. The green lines show the evolution of
this stock with actual changes to trade and migration policies. The dashed lines show the evolution holding trade
and migration policies unchanged. The panel, (left column) presents the results for all workers, and panel b (right
column) presents the results for high and low skilled workers.
We now turn to compute the change in the stock of migrants across different skills, and after
doing so, we discuss the interaction between migration and trade policies. Figure 4, panel b,
presents the evolution of the stock of low and high skill NMS migrants in EU15 countries. In Table
3, columns (1) and (3), we decompose the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries by skill.
We find that the EU enlargement primarily increases the migration of low killed NMS workers to
EU-15 countries, and to a much lesser extent the migration of high skilled workers. For instance,
as we can see from the table, the stock of NMS high skilled workers in EU-15 countries increases
by 0.014 percentage point, or 53.2 thousands by 2007, by 0.06 percentage point or 217.8 thousands
by 2015, and by 0.14 percentage point or by about 521.1 thousands in the long run. We find that
the change in the stock of NMS unskilled workers is much larger. Specifically, for the case of low
skilled workers, the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.066 percentage point
or 245.6 thousands by 2007, by 0.3 percentage point or 1.1 million by 2015, and by 0.75 percentage
point or by about 2.8 million in the steady state.
We can also use the model to compute what the migration effects would have been in the absence
of changes to trade policy. In columns (2) and (4) of Table 3, we compute the change in the stock
of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries holding trade policy constant. We find that migration would
have been larger in the absence of changes to trade policy. For instance, the stock of low skilled
workers would have been about 145 thousands larger in the long run, and the stock of high skilled
workers would have been about 130 thousands larger.
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Table 3: Migration effects by skill group: Change in the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15
High skill (%) High skill (thous.)
∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy ∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy
2002 0 0 0 0
2007 0.014 0.019 53.2 69.4
2015 0.058 0.066 217.8 247.3
Steady state 0.140 0.174 521.1 650.3
Low skill (%) Low skill (thous.)
∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy ∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy
2002 0 0 0 0
2007 0.066 0.070 245.6 261.7
2015 0.299 0.309 1,115 1,152
Steady state 0.745 0.784 2,780 2,925
Notes: This table shows the percentage and absolute change in the stock of low skill and high skill NMS
nationals in EU-15 countries due to the 2004 EU enlargement. Columns 2 and 4 report the counterfactual
change in the absence of trade policy changes.
5.2 Welfare Effects
We now turn to the welfare analysis. We start by describing the welfare effects of the EU en-
largement in our model developed in Section 3. We then study the interaction between trade and
changes to migration policy. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of the different mechanisms
that operate in our structural model.
Table 4, column (1) presents the welfare effect of the EU enlargement. Similar to the previous
section, to compute these welfare effects, we feed into our structural model the estimated changes
in migration costs and the observed changes in tariffs over 2002-2007, and compute the change in
welfare, measured in terms of consumption equivalent, compared with an economy where migration
and trade policies stayed unchanged. We do so across skills, and nationalities (NMS nationals and
EU nationals), and to facilitate the analysis we aggregate individual countries into NMS and EU-15
countries using employment as weights. Before turning to the results, it is important to clarify the
interpretation of the welfare numbers from the table. In particular, the welfare effect for a given
country and skill group, say NMS low skilled workers, corresponds to the change in welfare, measure
in consumption equivalent, of a representative low skilled worker living in NMS countries previous
to the EU enlargement. In other words, this welfare number takes into account both migrants and
stayers.
Turning to the results in the table, we can see that the largest winners are the NMS countries,
and in particular the low skilled workers. Welfare of NMS low skilled workers increases 1.71%,
while welfare for skilled workers increases 1.19%. The larger welfare effect for low skilled workers is
explained by a higher option value of migration for low skilled workers than for high skilled workers
due to the fact that, for instance, low skilled workers are relatively more scarce in EU-15 countries.
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Table 4: Welfare effects of trade and migration policies, percent
EU Only changes to Only changes to
enlargement trade policy migration policy
E
U
-1
5 High skill 0.503 0.439 0.060
Low skill 0.386 0.442 -0.055
Aggregate 0.409 0.441 -0.032
N
M
S High skill 1.191 1.098 0.090
Low skill 1.715 1.073 0.615
Aggregate 1.653 1.076 0.554
Europe 0.622 0.550 0.068
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in welfare, measured as consumption equivalent, from changes to
migration and trade policy. Column 2 presents the welfare effects due to changes in migration and trade policies,
Column 3 presents the welfare effects from only changes to trade policy, and Column 4 shows the welfare effects due
to only changes to migration policy.
As a result, as we explained above, more low skilled workers than high skilled workers migrate to
EU-15 countries after the EU enlargement. On the other hand, we find relatively smaller welfare
effects for workers in EU-15 countries. Welfare increases 0.50% for high skilled workers and 0.39%
for low skilled workers. High skilled workers in EU-15 countries benefit from the increase in the
relative supply of low skilled labor after the reduction in migration restrictions, and the resulting
expansion in total output. We find that aggregate NMS welfare increases 1.65%, using employment
to aggregate across skills. Welfare in EU-15 countries increases 0.41%, and aggregate welfare for
Europe increases 0.62%.
In column (2) of Table 4, we present the welfare effects of only changes to trade policy. Specifi-
cally, we feed into our structural model the changes to tariffs over 2002-2007, but we hold migration
costs constant at the initial level. We find positive welfare effects across all countries and skill
groups. Welfare gains are larger for NMS countries than for EU countries as they experience a
larger decline in tariffs. For the case of EU-15 countries, welfare gains for high skilled and low
skilled workers, are about 0.44%, and for the EU-15 as a whole as well. In NMS countries, wel-
fare gains for high and low skilled workers are 1.10% and 1.07%, respectively, and 1.08% for the
aggregate NMS.
The third column in Table 4 presents the welfare effects of only changes to migration policy. To
do so, we feed into the model the estimated changes in migration costs, but hold tariffs constant
at the initial level. We find that welfare for both EU-15 and NMS countries, and across both
skill groups, are lower in the absence of changes to trade policy. In particular, we find that in
the absence of changes to trade policy, the EU-15 countries as a whole would have lost from the
EU enlargement. For the case of NMS countries, welfare would have increased 0.09% for skilled
workers, and 0.62% for unskilled workers. Welfare for NMS as whole increases by 0.55% with only
changes to migration policy, and welfare for Europe would have been 0.07%.
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Table 5: Trade openness and welfare effects of migration policy (percent)
Only changes to Changes to migration policy Changes to migration policy
migration policy under trade autarky under free trade
E
U
-1
5 High skill 0.060 0.071 0.058
Low skill -0.055 -0.049 -0.056
Aggregate -0.032 -0.025 -0.033
N
M
S High skill 0.090 0.043 0.098
Low skill 0.615 0.563 0.625
Aggregate 0.554 0.502 0.563
Europe 0.068 0.065 0.068
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in welfare, measured as consumption equivalent, due to the actual
changes to migration policy. Column 2 presents the welfare effects under the actual level of trade openness, Column
3 shows the welfare effects under trade autarky, and Column 4 shows the welfare effects under free trade.
In Table 5 we study further the interaction between trade and migration policies. In particular,
we study the welfare effects of the changes to migration policy under three different levels of goods
market integration. Column (1) replicates the third column in the previous table, and therefore it
shows the welfare effects of the actual changes to migration policy under the actual level of trade
integration at the time of the EU-enlargement. In Column (2) we compute the welfare effects of
the actual changes to migration policy if Europe would have been under trade autarky at the time
of the enlargement. To do so, we first compute the equilibrium allocations when trade costs are set
to infinite, and we then feed into the model the changes to migration policies. In Column (3), we
study the welfare effects of the actual changes to migration policy if Europe would have been a free
trade area at the time of the enlargement. To do so, we first compute the equilibrium allocations
when tariffs are eliminated, and we then feed into the model the changes to migration and trade
policies.
We can see from the table how the level of trade openness impacts the welfare effects of migration
policy. In particular, for the case of NMS countries, welfare effects would have been about 12% lower
under trade autarky compared to free trade. The intuition is that NMS countries that experience
a net outflow of workers that put upward pressures on labor costs would have experienced a loss in
their terms of trade with trade restrictions compared with a situation of free trade. The opposite
happens in EU-15 countries that experience a net inflow of workers. We can see from the table
that EU-15 countries would have had smaller welfare losses from the changes to migration policy
under trade autarky, although this effect is very small. The important take away of these exercises
is that trade has a quantitative impact on the welfare evaluation of migration policy.
Finally, Figure 5 presents the welfare effects of the EU enlargement across different countries.
We can see from the figure that although NMS countries are the largest winners, there is hetero-
geneity in the welfare effects across countries. Overall, we find that Poland, Hungary and Lithuania
are the largest winners from the EU enlargement.
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Figure 5: Welfare effects, percent
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Notes: These figures present the welfare effects of the EU enlargement across different countries and skill groups.
5.2.1 Extensions: Accounting for the Provision of Public Goods
In this section we extend our model to account for additional congestion effects coming from the
provision of public goods. In particular, this extension is motivated by evidence on the fact that
migrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare system across countries, and therefore are more likely
to use social benefits and consume public goods than natives.36 To capture the congestion of public
goods due to immigration, we assume that households derive some utility from the per capita
provision of public goods in the economy. Specifically, the indirect utility of a household with skill
s in country i is given by
Cis,t =
(
Gi
Lit
)αi (
(1− τ iL)
wis,t
P it
)1−αi
, (14)
36See Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a survey.
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where P it is the local price index, and αi is the fraction of public goods in total consumption.
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The supply of public goods, Gi, is fixed over time. In order to supply Gi the government purchases
final goods and finances its spending from three sources: tariff revenues, labor taxes (τ iL), and lump
sum transfers from the owners of fixed factors in each country. As a result, the government budget
constraint is given by
P itG
i = T it +
∑N
n=1
∑
s=h,lτ
i
Lw
i
s,tL
i
n,s,t +R
i
t for all i, (15)
where the double summation term on the right-hand side represents labor tax revenues, and Rit
are lump-sum taxes.
The total expenditure on goods by country i is now given by government purchases, by net labor
income of workers of all skill levels and nationalities residing in country i, and by local rentiers.
Namely, the goods market clearing is given by
Xit = P
i
tG
i +
∑N
n=1
∑
s=h,l(1− τ iL)wis,tLin,s,t + ιiχt −Rit, for all i, (16)
with χt =
∑N
i=1 r
i
tH
i. As we can see, the net income of rentiers is given by the share of the global
portfolio minus lump-sum taxes, (ιiχt −Rit).
The equilibrium of this economy is the same as that described in Section 3.4, but with the
indirect utility given by (14), and the market clearing conditions given by (15) and (16). Given this,
the CDP solution method described in Section (3.5) also applies in this economy with public goods.
To compute the the model, we need to re-estimate the migration cost elasticity 1/ν consistent with
the utility function (14). In Appendix (D.1) we show how to adapt the estimation methodology
to the model with public goods. We estimate a value of ν = 1.89 that we feed into the model
to quantify the migration and welfare effects of the EU enlargement. We also need to compute
the fraction of public goods in total consumption αi, which we construct as final government
consumption over total final consumption by country using consumption data from the WIOD.38
Finally, we resort to data on labor income taxes from the OECD Tax Database.
We now turn to quantify the migration and welfare effects of the EU enlargement in the model
with public goods. Starting with the migration effects, we still find a very gradual increase in the
stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 country as a consequence of the enlargement. In terms of the
magnitudes, we find somewhat lower migration effects in the model with public goods. Specifically,
three years after the EU enlargement (that is, in 2007) the stock of NMS nationals in EU countries
increases by 0.02%, while ten years after the implementation, the stock raises by 0.20%. In steady
state, the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.48% as a result of the EU
enlargement. In the presence of public goods, immigration strains public goods which introduces
an additional source of congestion. As a consequence, the households’ utility and incentives to
migrate reduce compared to the economy without public goods. Across skills, we find that most
37Similar specifications for preferences of public goods have been used recently in other quantitative studies, see
Fajgelbaum et al. (2015).
38The values of αi across countries range from 0.16 to 0.31, with a mean value of 0.21.
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of the migration, as a consequence of the enlargement, is unskilled, similarly to our finding in
Section 5.1. In the long run, the stock of NMS skilled workers in EU-15 countries increases by 0.10
percentage point or by about 375.5 thousands, while the stock of NMS unskilled workers increases
by 0.58 percentage point or by about 2.2 million. In terms of the interaction between migration
and trade policies, we still find that migration would been larger, by about half million workers in
steady state, in the absence of changes to trade policy.
We now turn to the analysis of the welfare effects of the EU enlargement in the presence of public
goods. Overall, in the presence of public goods we find larger welfare gains for NMS countries, and
smaller welfare gains for EU-15 countries, compared with the results in Section 5.1. This result is
explained by the fact that EU-15 countries experience a net inflow of workers, which congests public
goods and has a negative impact on welfare compared with a model without public goods. On the
other hand, the net outflow of workers in NMS countries contributes to decongesting public goods,
which has a positive effect on welfare. We still find that the largest winners are the NMS countries,
and in particular the unskilled workers. Welfare of NMS unskilled workers increases 1.64%, while
welfare for skilled workers increases 1.19%. On the other hand, we find smaller welfare effects for
workers in EU countries. Welfare increases 0.31% both skilled workers and 0.25% for unskilled
workers. Skilled workers in EU-15 countries benefit from the increase in the relative supply of
unskilled labor after the reduction in migration restrictions, and the resulting expansion in total
output. We find that aggregate NMS welfare increases 1.59%, while EU-15 welfare increases 0.26%.
Aggregate welfare for Europe increases 0.49% as a result of the EU enlargement in the model with
public goods.
Finally, Figure 6 presents the welfare effects from the EU enlargement in the presence of public
goods. Poland and Hungary are the largest winners in this case. The United Kingdom, the
country that experience the largest inflow of workers now experience welfare losses coming from
the congestion of public goods and infrastructure that more than offset the productivity gains from
a larger market.
5.2.2 Welfare Effects: Additional Results
We now proceed to further study the role trade, fixed factors and scale effect in shaping the welfare
effects from the EU enlargement. In the previous section, we already studied the role of public
goods, their welfare effects, and how they reduces the incentive to migration by straining the stock
of public goods and reducing households’ utility as a result. In this section, we study the role
of other mechanisms in shaping the welfare effects of the EU enlargement, namely, scale effects,
fixed factors, and trade openness. Table 6 shows the results. Column (1) of the table reproduces
the benchmark results, that is, the welfare effects from changes to migration and trade policies
described in Section 5.1 and 5.2. In column (2), we shut down the scale effects in the benchmark
model, but we let the other mechanisms operate. In this case, welfare declines for EU-15 countries
and increases for NMS countries compared with the model in which all mechanisms operate. In
particular, the absence of scale effects subtracts 0.06 percentage points of welfare in EU-15 countries
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Figure 6: Welfare effects with public goods, percent
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Notes: These figures present the welfare effects of the EU enlargement across different countries and skill
groups with the presence of public goods.
and adds 0.3 percentage points of welfare in NMS countries. The reason is that the net inflow of
migrants in EU-15 results in an increase in productivity in the presence of scale effects, and the
NMS that have a net outflow of workers experience a productivity decline in the presence of scale
effects.
Finally, in column (3) we compute the welfare effects under autarky, and where we also shut
down all congestion effects (infrastructure and public goods) as well as scale effects. To do so, we
first compute the equilibrium allocations when trade costs are set to infinite, and we then feed
into the model the changes to migration and trade policies. Welfare effects in EU-15 and NMS
countries, at the aggregate and across skills, are substantially smaller than those in Column (1).
For instance, welfare gains are about 0.43 percentage point lower for EU-15 countries and about
1.2 percentage points smaller for the case of NMS. Moreover, high skilled workers in NMS countries
and low skilled workers in EU-15 countries would have lost according to this modified model.
With this final counterfactual exercise we want to emphasize again the importance of accounting
for trade, and other ingredients of the model such as local fixed factors and scale effects when
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Table 6: Welfare effects under different model assumptions
EU No scale Autarky, no congestion
enlargement effects and scale effects
E
U
-1
5 High skill 0.503 0.416 0.090
Low skill 0.386 0.331 -0.042
Aggregate 0.409 0.348 -0.016
N
M
S High skill 1.191 1.478 -0.003
Low skill 1.715 2.020 0.465
Aggregate 1.653 1.957 0.410
Europe 0.622 0.623 0.057
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in welfare, measured as consumption equivalent, under
different model assumptions. Column 1 presents the welfare effects due to the actual changes in migration
and trade policies, Column 2 presents the welfare effects in a model without scale effects, and Column 3
shows the welfare effects in a model with trade autarky, without scale effects, and without congestion effects.
evaluating the welfare impact of migration and trade policies.
6 Conclusion
Migration and trade are two themes that, historically and nowadays, are central in Europe as
well as in other regions of the world. The freedom of movement of workers and of goods are
considered as two of the four fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law. At the same time,
immigration into Europe during the enlargement process, as well as the influx of refugees from
war-torn countries, are recent major shocks whose economic effects are hard to evaluate, since they
interact with heterogeneous production structures, free intra-Community trade, and the European
Union Customs Union. In this context, the international economics literature has made considerable
advances on the quantification and understanding of the gains from economic integration, but most
of the focus has been on the goods market, and less attention has been devoted to the factors
market and to migration policy. In this paper we aim at making progress in this area.
We quantify the general equilibrium effects of trade and labor market integration. We show
that in order to evaluate the economic effects of labor market integration it is crucial to take in
too account the process of integration in the goods market. We find that the EU enlargement
primarily fostered the migration of low skilled workers and that trade policy helped to moderate
migration flows and mitigate congestion effects. The largest winners were the new member states,
and in particular their low skilled workers, although we find positive welfare effects for high skilled
workers as well. Importantly, we find that in the absence of changes to trade policy, the EU-15
would have been worse off after the enlargement. This result is robust to the inclusion of other
mechanisms in the model, like the presence of public goods financed with labor taxes.
Our paper incorporates different but complementary elements in the analysis. We use reduced-
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form analysis that exploits migration policy changes to identify changes in migration costs and key
elasticities. We build a rich dynamic general equilibrium model that includes important mechanisms
considered in the literature to quantify the migration and welfare effects of actual changes to trade
and migration policies. Among other things, we show quantitatively how the effects of labor market
integration are affected by the extent to which countries are open to trade. Future work might aim
at studying the distributional effects across sectors of the economy. Sectoral linkages are important
for trade policy quantitative analysis and they might well be also for migration policy evaluation.
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A EU Accession and the Freedom of Movement of Workers
In this Appendix we describe in detail the process that resulted in the entry of ten new countries
into the European Union in 2004, i.e. the EU membership process.
The process of joining the EU broadly consists of 4 stages. It is in essence based on the prospec-
tive member’s ability of satisfying the accession criteria—also called the “Copenhagen criteria” after
the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 which defined them. The accession criteria have a po-
litical (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect
for and protection of minorities), economic (a functioning market economy and the capacity to
cope with competition and market forces) and administrative/institutional (capacity to effectively
implement EU law, and ability to take on the obligations of membership) component. The four
stages that characterize the membership process are the following.
1. Official candidate for membership. A country wishing to join the EU submits a membership
application to the Council of the European Union, which asks the European Commission to
assess the applicant’s ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria. If the Commission’s opinion
is positive, membership negotiations cannot start until all EU governments agree, in the
form of a unanimous decision by the EU Council. Negotiations take place between ministers
and ambassadors of the EU governments and the candidate country in what is called an
intergovernmental conference.
2. Negotiations. The negotiation process includes three stages: screening, definition of coun-
terparties’ negotiation positions, and closing of the negotiations. In the screening phase, the
European Commission, together with the candidate country, prepares a detailed report of how
well the candidate country is prepared in each of the 36 Chapters of the EU Law, spanning
all major economic, social, and institutional aspects (e.g the free movement of goods, justice,
and defense policy). If the results of the screening are satisfactory the Commission makes a
recommendation to open negotiations. The candidate country then has to submit its position
on every chapter of EU Law, and the EU must adopt a common position. Negotiations then
continue until the candidate’s progress is considered satisfactory in any field.
3. Accession Treaty. Once negotiations are successfully concluded, the Accession Treaty (con-
taining the detailed terms and conditions of membership, all transitional arrangements and
deadlines, as well as details of financial arrangements and any safeguard clauses) is prepared.
4. Support and Ratification. The Accession Treaty becomes binding once (i) it wins the support
of the EU Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament; (ii) it is signed by the
candidate country and representatives of all existing EU countries; and (iii) it is ratified by the
candidate country and every individual EU country, according to their constitutional rules.
Table A.1 shows the date of application, the accession date, as well as population for each NMS
country.
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Table A.1: NMS Countries Characteristics
Date of Application Accession Date 2004 Population
Cyprus July 3rd, 1990 May 1st, 2004 1.01
Estonia November 24th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 1.36
Hungary March 31st, 1994 May 1st, 2004 10.11
Latvia October 13th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 2.26
Lithuania December 8th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 3.34
Malta July 3rd, 1990 May 1st, 2004 0.40
Poland April 5th, 1994 May 1st, 2004 38.18
Czech Republic January 17th, 1996 May 1st, 2004 10.20
Slovakia June 27th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 5.37
Slovenia June 10th, 1996 May 1st, 2004 2.00
Notes: 2004 population (in millions) from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents
regardless of legal status or citizenship.
A.1 Migration Policies
The new members states had to comply with the fundamental principles of the European Union.
Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union states that “The Union is founded on the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law,
principles which are common to the member states.” The freedom of movement of workers is
considered as one of the four fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law (acquis communautaire),
along with the free movement of goods, services, and capital.39 EU law effectively establishes the
right of EU nationals to freely move to another member state, to take up employment, and reside
there with their family members, as well as protects against any possible discrimination, on the
basis of nationality, in employment-related matters.
The Accession Treaty of 2003 (European Union (2003)) allowed the “old” member states to
temporarily restrict—for a maximum of 7 years—the access to their labor markets to citizens from
the accessing countries, with the exception of Malta and Cyprus.40 These temporary restrictions
were organized in three phases according to a 2+3associated to the +2 formula: During an initial
period of 2 years (May 1st, 2004 to April 30th, 2006), member states, through national laws, could
regulate the access of workers from all new member states, except Malta and Cyprus; member states
could then extend their national measures for an additional 3 years (until April 30th, 2009), upon
notification to the European Commission; an additional extension for other 2 years was possible
39As effectively and concisely defined by Article 45 (ex Article 39 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the freedom of movement of workers entails “the
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment”, Council of the European Union (2012).
40These restrictions could only be applied to workers but not to the self-employed. They only applied to obtaining
access to the labor market in a particular member state, not to the freedom of movement across member states. Once
a worker has been admitted to the labor market of a particular member state, Community law on equal treatment as
regards remuneration, social security, other employment-related measures, and access to social and tax advantages is
valid.
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in case the member state notified the European Commission of a serious disturbance in its labor
market or threat thereof.41 The transitional arrangements were scheduled to end irrevocably seven
years after accession—i.e. on April 30th, 2011.
Figure A.1 shows the set of bilateral arrangements before the 2004 enlargement (Panel a), and
during each of the three phases (Panels b, c, and d). A blue cell means that there are no restrictions
in place in flowing from the origin to the destination country, i.e. EU law on free movement of
workers apply. A yellow (mixed blue-yellow) cell means that some restrictions are in place during
(part of) the phase.
Before 2004. Panel (a) shows that, before the 2004 enlargement, workers could flow freely within
the EU-15 member states but not between EU-15 and NMS as well as between NMS countries.
Phase 1. On May 1st, 2004, the U.K. (together with Ireland and Sweden) opens its borders
to NMS countries, which reciprocate by opening their borders to British citizens. All the other
EU-15 countries keep applying restrictions to NMS countries, except to Cyprus and Malta. All
NMS countries decide to open their border to EU-15 member states, except for Hungary, Poland,
and Slovenia which apply reciprocal measures. Finally, NMS countries lift all restrictions among
each others.
Phase 2. On May 1st, 2006, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, followed by Italy on July 27th, lift
restrictions on workers from EU-8 countries. As a consequence, Hungary and Poland drop their
reciprocal measures towards these four member states. Slovenia lifts its reciprocal measures on
May 25th, 2006, Poland on January 17th, 2007, while Hungary simplifies its reciprocal measures
on January 1st, 2008. During phase 2, The Netherlands (on May 1st, 2007), Luxembourg (on
November 1st, 2007), and France (on July 1st, 2008) also lift restrictions on workers from EU-8
countries.
Phase 3. Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Austria keep restricting access to their labor markets
under national law. Hungary applies (simplified) reciprocal measures, limiting access to its labor
market for workers from EU-15 member states that restrict the access of Hungarian workers.
Belgium and Denmark opened their labor market to NMS countries on May 2009, while Austria
and Germany opened their labor markets at the end of the transitional period, on May 2011.
41The EU-25 member states that decide to lift restrictions can, throughout the remainder of the transitional period,
be able to reintroduce them, using the safe-guard procedure set out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, should they undergo
or foresee disturbances on their labor markets. Notwithstanding the restrictions, a member state must always give
preference to EU-2 (Malta and Cyprus) and EU-8 workers over those who are nationals of a non-EU country with
regard to access to the labor market.
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Figure A.1: Migration restrictions: transitional arrangements between EU-15 and NMS
(a) Before the 2004 Enlargement
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(b) Phase 1 - May 1st, 2004 to April 30th, 2006
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(c) Phase 2 - May 1st, 2006 to April 30th, 2009
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(d) Phase 3 - May 1st, 2009 to April 30th, 2011
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Note: Origin countries on the rows, destination countries on the columns. EU-15 member states (AT, BE, DE, DK,
GR, FR, IT, PT, U.K.) followed by NMS countries (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL)) in bold. A blue cell means that
there are no migration restrictions in place in flowing from the origin to the destination country, i.e. EU law on free
movement of workers apply. A yellow (mixed blue-yellow) cell means that some migration restrictions are in place
during (part of) the phase.
A.2 Trade Policies
New member states became part of the European Union Customs Union, and of the European
common commercial policy.42 The customs union implies that members apply the same tariffs
to goods imported from the rest of the world, and apply no tariffs internally among members.43
The common commercial policy covers trade in goods and services, intellectual property rights,
42The customs union initiated with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, kick-started on July 1st 1968, and it is regulated
by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The common commercial policy is also set down in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
43Once the goods have cleared customs, they can circulate freely or be sold anywhere within the EU customs
territory. Import duties collected by customs remain an important source of income for the EU. In 2013, they
represented nearly 11 percent of the EU budget, which amounts to¿15.3 billion. Besides common tariffs, an important
aspect of the customs union is the implementation of common and streamlined procedures across the union regardless
of where in the EU the goods are declared. Reduced time, homogeneity of rules, and lower uncertainty can be
significant factors in boosting trade relationships (Hummels et al. (2007); Hummels and Schaur (2013); Martincus
et al. (2015); Handley and Limao (2015)).
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Figure A.2: Tariff rates between EU-15 and NMS, and within NMS, 2002-2007
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Note: These graphs show the evolution of the average effectively applied rate between NMS and EU-15, as well as
within NMS. Averages have been constructed using the WTO and TRAINS tariff data, as described in Section 4 and
Appendix B.3.1, using the same set of 10 EU-15 countries and 7 NMS countries as in our data set on gross migration
flows.
and foreign direct investment. As a consequence of the EU enlargement process, the new member
states automatically entered into international trade agreements to which the EU is a party, and
forwent their own existing agreements.44
Figure A.2 reports the evolution of tariffs applied and faced by NMS countries before and
after the enlargement, and shows that the convergence process was still ongoing two years before
the accession. The average tariff rate before the enlargement is about 4.5 percent between NMS
countries, 4.0 percent from NMS to EU-15 countries, and 3.5 percent from EU-15 to NMS countries,
respectively.45 From 2004 on instead, tariffs between all EU-25 countries are zero, and tariffs vis-
a`-vis the Rest of the World are the same for EU-15 and NMS countries.
44The entry of the new member states into the EU common commercial policy also had an impact in terms of
bargaining power. While all the ten new EU member states were already part of the WTO before 2004, from 2004
on they participate to the WTO’s activities through the European Commission. EU trade policy is in fact carried on
by the European Commission, on behalf of the European Union, working closely with the member states and keeping
informed the European Parliament.
45The average tariff rate that NMS countries faced when trading with the rest of the world was 7.6 percent, while
the average rate applied by NMS countries towards the rest of the world was 4.6 percent, in the two years preceding
the enlargement.
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B Data
B.1 List of Countries
The sample includes 17 European countries and a constructed rest of the world (RoW). Of our 17
countries, 10 are pre-2004 EU members and 7 countries joined the EU in 2004. The list of pre-
2004 EU members includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom while the new members are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Overall, these 17 countries cover about 91 percent of the
population of the 25 members of the European Union in 2004.
We assign Ireland, The Netherlands, Malta, Sweden and Slovenia to the RoW aggregate be-
cause their EU-LFS country surveys do not contain sufficient information regarding the country
of residence 12 months before the worker was interviewed. Specifically, Ireland does not provide
information on the country of origin for any year in the survey, making it impossible to construct
migration flows from any country in the sample to Ireland. The country surveys for the Nether-
lands and Malta are available from 2006 and 2009 onward respectively, hence after the enlargement
of the European Union. The case of Sweden presents two different problems: first, data before
2005 contain information on the country of residence 12 months before only if this is Sweden itself.
Moreover, in 2005 and 2006 there is no information on the country of origin in the Swedish survey.
Finally, in the Slovenian survey information on the country of origin is available from 2008 on only.
We also assign Bulgaria, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Romania and Finland to the RoW due to
missing information on the nationality of the workers. More specifically, Romania has information
on nationality only from 2004 onward, Bulgaria has no information on nationality before 2008,
Slovakia has no information before 2003 while Finland does not distinguish the nationality of the
countries involved in the 2004 enlargement from the nationality of Bulgaria and Romania, which
entered the European Union in 2007.
B.2 Construction of the Data-set on Gross Migration Flows
Data on gross migration flows by country of origin, destination, nationality, skill, and year are con-
structed from the micro data of the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). For each individual
surveyed, the questionnaire reports the country in which the individual resided 12 months be-
fore—besides reporting the current country of residence, the year and week in which the individual
was interviewed, and a sampling weight that makes the survey representative at the national level.
We refer to the country in which the survey was carried out as “destination”, and to the country
in which the interviewed individual was living 12 months before as “origin”. The questionnaire
also reports information regarding the age, education, and nationality of the worker. We focus on
individuals between 15 and 65 years old, and use the information reported to infer if the individual
is a migrant—in case the country where she resides today is different from the one she was residing
one year before—as well as the origin country, and the year of migration.
44
B.2.1 Frequency, Completeness, and Date of Migration
From 1983 to 1997, the European Labour Force Survey was conducted only in spring (quarter
1 or 2 depending on the country). Since 1998, the transition to a quarterly continuous survey
(with reference weeks spread uniformly throughout the year) has been gradually conducted by
member states. Some countries first introduced a continuous annual survey (meaning the reference
weeks were uniformly distributed throughout the spring quarter) and then switched to a quarterly
collection, whereas others moved directly to a quarterly continuous survey. For simplicity, we make
every survey continuous quarterly. We emphasize that the reason for doing this is just practical.
The procedure outlined below does not affect our results in any way since our analysis is carried
on at the destination-origin-nationality-skill-year level and the procedure operates instead at the
intra-annual level.
1. For each survey we count the number of weeks in which interviews were carried on.
2. We multiply the sampling weight associated to each interview by the number of weeks covered
in the survey and divide by 52.
3. We compute a representative week by averaging out the sampling weight associated to each
interview, by destination, origin, and year.
4. We assign the representative week to any week not originally covered by the survey, thereby
ending up with 52 weeks for each country of destination and year.
We make three further corrections to the EU-LFS survey. First, in a minority of instances in some
surveys—about 1.8 percent of the individuals, once accounting for sampling weights—interviewed
individuals could, instead of indicating the specific country of origin, refer to a broad group.46
When the broad group is “European Union (EU-15)” we re-assign individuals to each individual
EU-15 country proportionally, by destination and year, on the basis of all the other observations
in which information on the specific country of origin is available. When the broad group is either
“Other European Economic Area”, ”Other Central and Eastern Europe”, or ”Other Europe” we
re-assign individuals to each individual NMS country proportionally, by destination and year, on
the basis of all the other observations in which information on the specific country of origin is
available. When the broad group is “Other or stateless” we re-assign, by destination and year,
individuals to the RoW. When the country of origin is missing we re-assign individuals to all other
countries proportionally, by destination and year, on the basis of all the other observations in which
information on the specific country of origin is available.
Second, for a few destination-origin-year-months the information is not complete. In those
cases, we use a standard interpolation procedure when the missing information is between two
years in which we have data, or backward projection if the missing year is at the beginning of
46This can also happen because of confidentiality concerns, which may differ on a country-by-country basis due to
national legislation, especially before the country joins the European Union.
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Table B.1: Nationality mapping - before 2004
Before 2004
Code Label EU-15 survey NMS8 survey
0 Nationals EU-15 NMS8
111 EU-15 EU-15 EU-15
911 Non EU-15 NMS8 or other ** NMS8 or other **
800 Non-National/Non-Native * EU-15, NMS8 or other ** EU-15, NMS8 or other **
After 2004
0 Nationals EU-15 NMS8
1 EU-15 EU-15 EU-15
2 NMS10 NMS8 NMS8
Multiple codes Other categories Other Other
Notes: * Non-National/Non-Native in case the distinction EU/Non-EU is not possible
** NMS8 using levels of ”other” flows based on 2004-8 data, residual belongs to ”other”
the series.47 Since the analysis carried on in the paper refers to the 2002-2007 period and some
of the destination-origin-year-months with incomplete observations refer to countries that we drop
from the analysis, the potential impact of the interpolations and projections on the results is even
smaller.
Third, the survey does not report the exact date of migration but only the country in which
the interviewed individual was living 12 months before. In other words, an individual that is
interviewed in April of 2006 in the United Kingdom and declares that 12 months before she was
living in Poland could have migrated out of Poland any time in the previous 12 months. Therefore,
we spread the sampling weight associated to this individual to the previous 12 months.
B.2.2 Nationality
The EU-LFS contains information on the nationality of the interviewed individuals. However,
mainly because of country-specific privacy regulations, the variable “nationality” has different cat-
egories before and after 2004. Specifically, before 2004 the variable “nationality” takes only four val-
ues: ”Nationals” (code 0), ”EU-15” (code 111), ”Non EU-15” (code 911), and ”Non-National/Non-
Native” (code 800) in case the distinction EU-15/Non-EU-15 is not available. After 2004, the
category ”Non EU-15” has been expanded to distinguish between “New member states NMS10”
(code 2) and other countries or groups of countries we will refer to as “other categories”. Our
goal is to create the following three nationality categories: “EU-15”, “NMS10” and “Other”. In
order to do so we have to redistribute individuals from the ”Non EU-15” category before 2004 into
47Interpolation is performed for the U.K. in 2008, and France in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Backward projection is used
for Latvia in 2001, 2002 and 2003, Czech Republic in 2001, Italy in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, Slovakia in 2001 and
2002.
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“NMS10” and ”Other”, as well as redistribute individuals from the ”Non-National/Non-Native”
category before 2004 into “EU-15”, “NMS10” and ”Other”. We now describe the procedure to
construct the nationality dimension of our migration data.48
In order to construct the nationality we need to deal with the number of people with nationality
”Other” (different from EU-15 and NMS nationals). We assume that the accession of NMS countries
does not affect the flow of ”other” nationals within the EU28. For every destination and origin
country pair, and for every year, we compute the number of ”other” nationals for the period 2004
onward. We then take the simple average—at the destination-origin level— over the period 2004-
2008 and we subtract it to the codes 800 and 911 before 2004.49 In practice, we do the following:
1. For the 800 group, we do a preliminary step: we split the 800 group in EU-15 and non EU-15
nationals using the average 2004-2008 shares of nonEU-15 within non-natives. In practice, we
do the following: consider an 800 observation—for a given destination-origin-year-week—with
weight x: the number of successes, n, from a Binomial with probability equal to the average
share described above and number of experiments equal to x is the number of ”nonEU-
15” associated to the observation. Then, x − n is the number of EU-15 associated to the
observation. In other words, we assume that each person summarized by the observation has
an equal and independent probability of being ”nonEU-15”. Note that it is important to
apply a Binomial to each observation because we want to preserve the information regarding
the reference week. We will use this information later on when we compute the emigration
shares.
2. Then, for every 911 and 800-turned-nonEU-15 observation, we apply a similar procedure to
split between NMS8 and ”other” nationals. In practice, we do the following:
(a) We compute the average number of “Other” post 2004 divided by the sum of the weights
of the 911 and 800-turned-nonEU-15 observations.
(b) We consider one of the 911 or 800-turned-nonEU-15 observations—for a given destination-
origin-year-week—with weight x: the number of successes, n, from a Binomial with
probability equal to the average share described in (a) and number of experiments equal
to x is the number of “other” associated to the observation. Then, x − n is the num-
ber of NMS8 nationals associated to the observation. In other words, we assume that
each person summarized by the observation has an equal and independent probability
of being “other”. Note that, here as well, it is important to apply a Binomial to each
observation because we want to preserve the information regarding the reference week.
We will use this information later on when we compute the emigration shares.
We define 3 nationalities, “EU-15”, “NMS10” and “Other” based on table B.1.
48After 2004, the surveys for Latvia report the category NMS13 instead of distinguishing between NMS10 and
NMS3. When creating nationalities described below, we use NMS13 in place of NMS10 for Latvia.
49For destination-origin pairs that appear before 2004 but not after, we assign, for each destination, the average
share across all origins. Note that in more than 99 percent of the cases this happens when country of origin is missing.
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The Case of Poland The variable nationality for Poland is available only since 2004 and it only
includes three codes: 0 “National / Native of own Country”, 5 “EU28”, and 8 “Europe outside
EU28”. In order to separate EU-15 from NMS10 nationals, we construct an alternative nationality
variable for Poland applying the origin-year-specific shares of EU-15, NMS10, and Other nationals
computed for Hungary to the survey for Poland. We choose Hungary as a reference because, just
like Poland and unlike other NMS countries, it applies reciprocal measures to EU-15 nationals.
Poland lifted the reciprocal measures on January 1st, 2007, while Hungary simplified the reciprocal
measures on January 1st, 2008.
B.2.3 Education
The EU-LFS contains information on the education level of the interviewed individuals. Each
individual is assigned an education level according to the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED 1997). We use the ISCED classification to split individuals into two education
levels, defining as high skilled all the individuals with at least tertiary education. We assign to the
low skilled group the residual workers with education up to post secondary non-tertiary education.
When information on education is missing, we proceed as follows: if in a destination-origin-year-
week we only observe individuals with either high skill (low skill) or missing education, we assume
all the individuals with missing education to be low (high) skilled. If in a destination-origin-year-
week we observe individuals with high skill, low skill and missing education, we proportionally split
the missings to high and low skill. Finally, if for a destination-origin-year-week we do not have any
information on education, we proportionally assign education using the average annual shares of
high and low skill migrants for that same destination-origin-year or destination-origin.
B.2.4 Stocks and Flows
Our goal is to construct a data set of migration flows that is internally consistent. Let’s consider
a given nationality-skill pair. For each country-year pair (i, t) we potentially have two separate
measures of the stock of individuals: the first measure comes directly from the EU-LFS (i, t)
survey; the second measure can be constructed from the set of EU-LFS {(i, t+ 1)i} surveys for the
following year. For example, the Polish survey of 2006 provides a measure of the number of low-skill
NMS nationals living in Poland in 2006. However, another measure can be constructed using the
surveys for all countries in 2007—including the survey for Poland—reporting immigrants that were
living in Poland the year before. Let’s define the first measure as SPL06 and the second measure as
S˜PL06 . If S
PL
06 > S˜
PL
06 we can conjecture that the difference
(
SPL06 − S˜PL06
)
captures migrants from
Poland to the RoW. To the contrary, if SPL06 < S˜
PL
06 we can replace S
PL
06 with S˜
PL
06 , and adjust the
migration flows between t− 1 and t accordingly. The following algorithm captures this idea.
1. Consider a given nationality, skill level, time interval t ∈ [0, ..., T ], and set of countries i ∈
{EU,NMS,ROW} where EU is the set of our 10 EU countries, NMS is the set of our 7
NMS countries, and ROW is a residual set of countries (that must be commonly defined in
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each survey).
2. Let Sit be the stock of people in country i-year t according to country i survey in year t. Let
F ijt−1,t be the flow of migrants from i to j between t− 1 and t according to country j survey
in year t.
3. Consider t = T .
(a) For each origin i in t = T − 1, it must be the case that either
i. SiT−1 >
∑
j F
ij
T−1,T (the stock is higher than the sum of the outflows) or
ii. SiT−1 <
∑
j F
ij
T−1,T (the stock is lower than the sum of the outflows).
(b) In the first case, we assume that the difference between the stock and the flows represents
migration from i to ROW, i.e. F˜ iROWT−1,T = S
i
T−1−
∑
j F
ij
T−1,T . Housekeeping: We also set
F˜ ijT−1,T = F
ij
T−1,T for all j 6= ROW , and S˜iT−1 = SiT−1.
(c) In the second case:
i. We trust the flows and update the stock in T − 1, i.e. we set S˜iT−1 = SiT−1 +[(∑
j F
ij
T−1,T
)
− SiT−1
]
;
ii. We also update the inflows, between T − 2 and T − 1 to be consistent with the new
stock S˜iT−1. We do so by increasing each inflow proportionally, i.e. F˜
ij
T−2,T−1 =
F ijT−2,T−1 +
(
F ijT−2,T−1/S
j
T−1
)(
S˜jT−1 − SjT−1
)
. Note that, since
∑
i F
ij
T−2,T−1 =
SjT−1, then
∑
i F˜
ij
T−2,T−1 = S˜
j
T−1. Housekeeping: We also set F˜
ij
T−1,T = F
ij
T−1,T
for all j 6= ROW , and F˜ iROWT−1,T = 0.
(d) Housekeeping: we set S˜iT = S
i
T for all i 6= ROW .
4. Consider now t = T − 1 and loop back to point 3.
After having performed the algorithm described above, we have the flows of migrants from each
pair of countries as well as the stock of people in each country and year, but we do not have
information on the stock of people in the RoW. We use information on population levels and on
the share of population between 15 and 64 years old from the World Bank World Development
Indicators database to construct the stock of people in the rest of world in 2002.50 We further use
the average year-nationality-skill share from our 17 countries (EU members plus NMS countries)
and apply them to the RoW population to split people in the relevant groups for our analysis.
Some destination-origin-nationality-skill-year sequences of migration flows consists in sequences
of zeros followed by positive values. While sequences of tiny values followed by larger flows do not
represent an issue, sequences of zeros followed by positive values cannot be handled by the model.
We perform the following procedure to, essentially, replace zeros with small positive values. We
start from the stock of individuals in 2002, which includes three zeros: high skill EU nationals in
50Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal
status or citizenship. The values used are midyear estimates.
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Estonia and Latvia, and low skill EU nationals in Lithuania. We compute the average ratio of low
to high skill EU nationals across NMS countries and apply the (inverse) ratio to the stock of high
(low) skill to turn the zeros into positive values. Then we consider the migration shares and set
them to be equal to the average migration share by year, nationality and skill group across countries
if the migration share is equal to zero. In case the average migration share is missing, we compute
the average across years. At the end of this procedure, we use the new migration shares and the
new stock for 2002 to recompute the stocks and flows by skill, nationality, origin, destination and
year. At the end of the procedure described above, we have a set of flows of workers by country of
origin, destination, nationality and skill in each year and a consistent set of stocks. We perform a
number of checks that confirm that the share of population by destination, as well as the change in
the share of population between 2002 and 2007, again by destination, is not significantly affected.
B.2.5 Migration Data Checks
In this appendix, we provide some external validation for our constructed gross migration data.
First, we compare the final migration data set with the raw data in terms of (i) the share of each
country population relative to the aggregate population, and (ii) the ratio between low and high
skill workers. In terms of the share of each country population relative to the aggregate population
we find that the correlation between the raw and final data is 0.998 in 2002, the first year in the
sample. The correlation between the 2002-2007 changes of the same shares is 0.542. In terms of
the ratio of low to high skill workers, the cross-country correlation between the raw and final data
is 0.996, while the correlation between the 2002-2007 changes is 0.865. Overall, we conclude that
the data comparison in terms of population shares and skill ratio is quite satisfactory.
Second, we compare the migration data set with migration information coming from alternative
data sources: Statistics Denmark and the UK Office for National Statistics. As mentioned above,
it is not easy to find accessible and comparable migration data. The UK is of particular interest
given the role it played in the 2004 EU enlargement, while Denmark is particularly well known
for collecting precise statistical information. We find that the correlation between the immigration
shares into Denmark, by year and country of origin, based on Statistics Denmark information and
based on our data is 0.79 for the 2003-2007 period. The correlation between the UK Office for
National Statistics aggregate inflow of migrants from NMS and the inflow based on our data is 0.93
for the 2003-2007 period.51
Finally, we use our migration data set to investigate a number of specific migration patterns
51Denmark: Statistics Denmark series on immigration by sex, age, citizenship, country of last residence and time
are published in the StatBank, INDVAN time series. These data include persons who took up residence in Denmark
and who had resided abroad before. The data come from the CPR, the central population register. We select people
between 15 and 64 years, aggregate the data by year and country of origin, and build immigration shares by dividing
by the corresponding Denmark population from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. UK: We
use the UK Office for National Statistics “Revised Net Long-Term International Migration” time series. These data
include long-term migrants, i.e. those that change their usual country of residence. The primary data source is the
International Passanger Survey (IPS), a continuous voluntary survey conducted at all principal air and sea routes
and the channel tunnel. Slovenia and Slovakia are included in the UK Office for National Statistics sample but not
in our data, while Cyprus is included in our data but not in the UK Office for National Statistics sample.
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Figure B.1: Top migration destinations from Poland, share of NMS nationals by skill, 2002-2007
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Note: These figures show the migration share out of Poland for low-skill and high skill NMS nationals for
the top 3 migration destinations in 2002 or 2007, plus the aggregate share for all other EU countries.
that have either been documented in the literature, or that have been prominently featured in
the press and are part of the public awareness. We focus on three migration routes: (i) from
Poland to Germany/UK, (ii) Portugal to France, and (iii) Italy to Germany/France/UK. The 2011
German Census reports that about 2.7 million people whose country of birth is Poland live in
Germany.52 While Germany has been, for several reasons throughout history, the main European
destination for Polish emigrants, Dustmann et al. (2015) notes that ”Whereas Germany was the
main destination in 1997, absorbing about 27 percent of the Polish emigrant population, the largest
destination country in 2007 was the UK (with 31 percent of all emigrants).”53 Figure B.1, using
our data on migration flows, clearly shows the leapfrogging of Germany by the UK in terms of main
European destination for emigration, both for low-skilled and high-skilled NMS nationals. Just like
for Poland, a large fraction of the Portuguese population lives abroad, and France has traditionally
been the main European destination for Portuguese migrants.54 The 2011 French Census reports
that about 6 percent of the Portuguese population lives in France. After France, the other top
four countries in terms of Portuguese-born people in 2011 are Spain, Luxembourg, Germany, and
Belgium. Our data set on gross flows of migrants for the 2002-2007 period confirms this ranking.
The third case we consider features another country which has experienced throughout history large
outflows of population: Italy. According to the 2011 Italian Census, the top four countries in terms
of stock of Italian-born population are France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Once again, with the exclusion of Switzerland our data is entirely consistent with the information
52The 2011 Population and Housing Census marks a milestone in census exercises in Europe. For the first time,
European legislation defined in detail a set of harmonized high-quality data from the population and housing censuses
conducted in the EU Member States.
53The figures mentioned in Dustmann et al. (2015)’s quote come from the Polish Labour Force Survey, a rotating
quarterly panel conducted in Poland by the Polish Central Statistical Office. The survey registers the country of
present residence for individuals who are part of the household but who have been residing abroad for more than 3
months.
54The New York Times article “Pictures Tell the Story of Portuguese in France” captures the importance of the
Portuguese presence in France in the 1960s.
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Table B.2: Imports and exports shares, EU-15 and NMS, 2002 and 2007
Imports shares
NMS importing from: EU-15 importing from:
Other NMS EU-15 RoW NMS Other EU-15 RoW
2002 5.7 52.6 41.7 3.9 46.9 49.2
2007 9.1 48.0 43.0 5.2 42.3 52.5
Change +3.4 -4.6 +1.3 +1.3 -4.6 +3.3
Exports shares
NMS exporting to: EU-15 exporting to:
Other NMS EU-15 RoW NMS Other EU-15 RoW
2002 6.2 54.6 39.2 3.8 43.8 52.4
2007 9.3 50.1 40.6 4.9 40.8 54.3
Change +3.1 -4.5 +1.4 +1.1 -3.0 +1.9
Notes: This table shows the weighted average imports and exports shares for NMS
and EU-15 countries. Averages have been constructed using the WTO and TRAINS
tariff data, as described in Section 4 and Appendix B.3.1, using the same set of ten
EU-15 countries and seven NMS countries as in our data set on gross migration
flows. The remaining countries are aggregated into the Rest of the World (RoW).
coming from the census.
B.3 Bilateral Trade
The bilateral trade flows between each state in the sample are computed using information from
the WIOD database (Timmer et al. (2015a)). We keep the set of countries consistent with the
migration data and we pool all the remaining countries in the rest of the world. Values are in US
dollars at current prices.
Table B.2 shows the share of NMS, EU-15, and Rest of the World, into either NMS or EU-15
imports or exports. The table points to three patterns. First, the larger trade integration among
NMS countries, whose average weight into imports or exports increases by 60 and 50 percent,
respectively within 5 years. Second, the larger weight of NMS in EU-15’s trade, which increases by
about 30 percent, within 5 years. Third, both EU-15 and NMS countries tend to trade more with
the Rest of the World, and less with EU-15 countries themselves. All patterns are consistent with
the reductions in tariffs, between EU-15 and NMS, among NMS countries, and between EU and
the Rest of the World discussed in Section 2.2.
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Figure B.2: Tariffs data
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B.3.1 Tariffs
The bilateral tariff data are constructed using the information in the WITS database. We use
effectively applied rates and we combine information from two different datasets, the TRAINS
data set and the WTO data set; the two datasets are compatible because TRAINS combines
information from different sources, among which WTO data. We start from the TRAINS data set,
which is the most complete of the two and we proceed as follows to make the series complete:
1. Use average EU-25 tariff applied to NMS8 to replace missing tariff when the destination
country of the exported good is a EU-15 country and the origin belongs to the NMS8 group.
2. Use average EU27 tariff applied to NMS2 to replace missing tariff when the destination
country of the exported good is a EU-15 country and the origin country belongs to the NMS2
group.
3. If the two criteria above do not fill the missing cells:
(a) Use WTO values to impute Trains values if WTO is not missing
(b) Missing values for 2003 are replaced with values from 2002. This could happen because
some NMS lowered their tariff before the formal access to the European Union. We
do not replace the missing values with zeros, but we impute the non-zero value of the
previous year.
(c) If we have missings in one year, we interpolate using the values of the year before. This
is the case for Lithuania in 2000.
(d) If all the values for a country are missing, we construct an average tariff of similar
countries and impute that value. This is the case for Latvia for which we do not observe
tariffs when exporters goods abroad; we thus use the average tariffs applied to the exports
of Lithuania and Estonia.
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We follow the same procedure using simple tariffs and weighted tariffs—where weights are given by
the amount of exports—and we obtain two complete sets of tariffs for each country in our sample
over time.
Figure B.2 reports the comparison among the simple and weighted average TRAIN tariff, the
WTO tariff, and the tariff we construct using the methodology described above.
B.4 Real Wages Share of Labor Compensation in Value Added
We compute the share of labor compensation in value added at the national level using information
from the socio economic accounts in the WIOD database. To construct the series of real wages we
use the information on the price levels of the countries in our sample from the Penn World Tables.
We use the variable ”Price level of CCON, equal to the PPP (ratio of nominal CON to CCON)
divided by the nominal exchange rate (National currency per USD)” which in other words is just
the ratio of expenditure at local prices to that at reference prices measured in the currency of the
base country—in our case the US.
Because the PPP is in units of the currency of country j per unit of the currency of the base
country, it is common to divide it by the nominal exchange rate to obtain what is called the “price
level” of country j (see Feenstra et al. (2015)). Moreover, we the WIOD database provides also
information on the employment level of each country over time, which constitutes the denominator
of the formula for real wages.
B.5 Portuguese Matched Employer-Employee Data
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal, a longitudinal data set matching virtually
all firms and workers based in Portugal.55 Reported data cover the firm itself, as well as each of
its workers. Each firm and each worker entering the database are assigned a unique, time-invariant
identifying number which can be used to follow firms and workers over time.
Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees. Each year,
every firm with wage earners is legally obliged to fill in a standardized questionnaire. Reported
data cover the firm itself, each of its plants, and each of its workers. The worker-level data cover
information on all personnel working for the reporting firms in a reference week. They include
information on gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings, hours worked (normal
and overtime), etc. The information on earnings includes the base wage (gross pay for normal
hours of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other regularly paid components, overtime
55Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been used by, among others,
\cite{Cabral03} to study the evolution of the firm size distribution; by \cite{Blanchard01} to compare the U.S. and
Portuguese labor markets in terms of unemployment duration and worker flows; by \cite{Cardoso05} to study the
determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and actual wages);
by \cite{Carneiro12} who, in a related study, analyze how wages of newly hired workers and of existing employees
react differently to the business cycle; by \cite{Martins09c} to study the effect of employment protection on worker
flows and firm performance. See these papers also for a description of the peculiar features of the Portuguese labor
market.
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Figure C.1: Log odds of migrating to the U.K. vs. staying in a NMS country for NMS nationals,
treatment and control flows, 2002-2007
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Note: Treatment flows in solid red, control flows in dashed blue. The pink vertical dashed line marks the
beginning of the treatment period.
work, and irregularly paid components.56 It does not include employer’s contributions to social
security.
The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the workplace—as required
by the law—imply a high degree of coverage and reliability. The public availability requirement
facilitates the work of the services of the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance of
firms with the law (e.g., illegal work).
C Change in Migration Costs: Placebo Plots and Residual Cases
In Section 4.3, we described the methodology used to identify changes in migration costs for the
main events in our sample period: the United Kingdom opening to NMS countries in 2004, followed
by Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal in 2006, and NMS countries opening their respective labor
markets to each other and (mostly) to EU-15 countries in 2004. We also ran a number of placebo
experiments to support our identification strategy. In this appendix we provide additional support
for the identification strategy by showing, in sub-appendix C.1, a series of plots that allow to
evaluate the common trend assumption. Sub-appendix C.2 reports similar plots for the placebo
experiments.
56It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to less measurement error than worker-
reported data. Furthermore, the Quadros de Pessoal registry is routinely used by the inspectors of the Ministry of
Employment to monitor whether the firm wage policy complies with the law.
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Figure C.2: Log odds of migrating to Greece/Italy/Spain/Portugal vs. staying in a NMS country
for NMS nationals, treatment and control flows, 2002-2007
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(c) Spain
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(d) Portugal
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
(L
og
) r
at
io 
of
 n
um
be
r
of
 m
igr
an
ts 
to
 st
ay
er
s
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year of emigration
Treatment: NMS8 to PT Control: NMS8 to EU5, and EU5 to PT
NMS nationals
Note: Treatment flows in solid red, control flows in dashed blue. The pink vertical dashed line marks the
beginning of the treatment period.
C.1 Common Trend Assumption
Figure C.1 shows the evolution over time of the (log) odds of migrating vs. staying (equation 10)
for the treated and control groups of NMS nationals. The treated group is represented by the NMS
to U.K. flow of NMS nationals, with the treatment period being after 2003. The control group is
represented by the NMS to EU-5 and EU-5 to U.K. flows of NMS nationals. The figure clearly
conveys two messages: First the odds for both the treated and control groups were increasing
before the 2004 enlargement; second, when comparing the pre-treatment and treatment periods,
the change in the odds of migrating is clearly positive for the treated group and close to zero for
the control group. These patterns are consistent with a substantial reduction in migration costs
from NMS to the United Kingdom.
Turning to the southern European destinations, Figure C.2 reports the evolution of the (log)
odds for Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal—with the treatment period being after 2005. Overall,
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Figure C.3: Log odds of migrating vs. staying for EU nationals (Placebo), from NMS countries to
Greece/Italy/Spain/Portugal, treatment and control, 2002-2007
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Note: Treatment flows in solid red, control flows in dashed blue. The pink vertical dashed line marks the
beginning of the treatment period.
the comparison between the log odds of the treatment and the control groups before the policy
changes confirms that the control groups represent a good measure of counterfactual log odds in
the absence of a policy change. Except for the case of Greece, the odds of migrating vs. staying de-
creases, from the pre-treatment to the treatment period, both for the control and the treated groups
but significantly less for the latter, pointing to a positive contribution associated to a reduction in
migration costs.
C.2 Placebo Experiment
As shown in Section 2.1, a placebo experiment confirms the prior that EU nationals did not expe-
rience any significant change in the cost of migrating back to Europe from NMS countries. Figure
C.3 reports the evolution of the (log) odds for the treated and control groups.
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D International Migration Elasticity
In this appendix we describe in detail the estimation method used to find the international migration
elasticity in Section 4.4. We estimate the international migration elasticity, 1/ν, by adapting the
method presented in Artuc¸ and McLaren (2015) to our theory and data. The method has two
stages: first the Poisson regression stage where we estimate value differences and the migration
cost function, normalized by ν, for every time period. Second, the Bellman equation stage, where
we insert the estimated value differences into a Bellman equation and construct a linear regression
to retrieve the international migration elasticity, 1/ν.57
The estimation method relies on the following two equilibrium conditions from the model: the
migration share equation
µijt,s =
[
exp
(
βV jt+1,s −mijt,s
)]1/ν
∑N
k=1
[
exp
(
βV kt+1,s −mikt,s
)]1/ν , (17)
and the Bellman equation
V it,s = log
(
Cit,s
)
+ ν log
[∑N
k=1
[
exp
(
βV kt+1,s −mikt,s
)]1/ν]
=
= log
(
wit,s/P
i
t
)
+ βEtV
i
t+1,s + Ω
i
t,s,
(18)
where
Cit,s =
wit,s
P it
is the consumption aggregator, and
Ωit,s = ν log
∑N
k=1
[
exp
(
β
(
V kt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mikt,s
)]1/ν
is the option value of migration.
First stage: Poisson regression The first stage is a fixed-effect estimation—based on the
migration share equation and bilateral gross migration flows data—to estimate value differences
and the migration cost function normalized by ν.
The estimating equation can be derived as follows. In the migration share equation (17),
multiply both numerator and denominator on the right hand side by
[
exp
(−βV it+1,s)]1/ν ,
µijt,s =
[
exp
(
β
(
V jt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mijt,s
)]1/ν
∑N
k=1
[
exp
(
β
(
V kt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mikt,s
)]1/ν .
Then multiply both sides by the mass of agents Lit,s,
57Since we estimate the elasticity using only flows of EU nationals within EU-15 we drop the n subscript.
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Lit,sµ
ij
t,s =
[
exp
(
β
(
V jt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mijt,s
)]1/ν
∑N
k=1
[
exp
(
β
(
V kt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mikt,s
)]1/νLit,s,
and rewrite as
Lit,sµ
ij
t,s = exp
(
β
ν
V jt+1,s −
β
ν
V it+1,s −
1
ν
mijt,s + logL
i
t,s −
1
ν
Ωit,s
)
. (19)
We interpret the equation above as Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. The first stage regres-
sion is then
Zijt,s = exp
(
λjt,s + α
i
t,s −
1
ν
mijt,s
)
+ εijt,s, (20)
where Zijt,s = L
i
t,sµ
ij
t,s asymptotically is the mass of agents with skill s moving from i to j in t, λ
j
t,s
is a destination-skill-time fixed effect, αit,s is an origin-skill-time fixed effect.
The estimation of (20) can be done pooling the observations associated to all years and skills
in the data. Since we estimate the migration elasticity using only flows of EU nationals within
EU-15 we assume that bilateral migration costs do not vary over time and skills, that is mijt,s = m
ij
for all {t, s} pairs. Note, however, that the cost of migrating out of country i, and into country j,
is still potentially skill-dependent because of αit,s, and λ
j
t,s, respectively. Finally, ε
ij
t,s is a random
disturbance of relative migration costs.
The λjt,s and α
i
t,s terms are not separately identified, so without loss of generality we set λ
1
t,s = 0
(or equivalently choose cell λ1t,s as the omitted category for the fixed effects). Similarly, not all m
ij
are separately identified, so without loss of generality we set all mi,1 and m1j to zero. Overall, this
is equivalent to defining the destination-skill-time fixed effects as
λjt,s =
β
ν
(
EtV
j
t+1,s − EtV 1t+1,s
)
− 1
ν
m1j , (21)
and the origin-skill-time fixed effects as
αit,s = −
β
ν
(
EtV
i
t+1,s − EtV 1t+1,s
)
+ logLit,s −
1
ν
Ωit,s −
1
ν
mi,1.
Note that the migration option value for an agent with skill s living in country i in year t can
be written as
1
ν
Ωit,s = −λit,s − αit,s + logLit,s −
1
ν
(
mi,1 −m1j) . (22)
Analogously to Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we use Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
to estimate equation (20). This implies that, if we write the estimating equation (20) in the form
W ijt,s = exp
(
xijt,sγt,s
)
+ εijt,s, where x
ij
t,s is a vector of dummy variables and γt,s is the vector of
parameters to be estimated, then we choose the parameters to solve the first-order condition∑
t
∑
ij
[
W ijt,s − exp
(
xijt,sγt,s
)]
xijt,s = 0.
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Second stage: Bellman equation In stage 1 we have estimated the destination-skill-time and
origin-skill-time fixed effects λjt,s and α
i
t,s. The second stage rewrites the Bellman equation (18) as
an estimating equation using the estimated values from the first stage.
Using (18), we can write
β
ν
EtV
i
t+1,s =
β
ν
[
log
(
wit+1,s
P it+1
)
+ βEtV
i
t+2,s + Ω
i
t+1,s
]
.
Using (22) to substitute out the continuation value Ωit+1,s, and using the expression for the
destination-skill-time fixed effects (21), we get
λit,s +
β
νEtV
1
t+1,s +
1
νm
1,i = βν log
(
wit+1,s
P it+1
)
+β
2
ν EtV
1
t+2,s − βαit+1,s + β logLit+1,s − βν
(
mi,1 −m1,i) . (23)
Define
φit,s = λ
i
t,s + βα
i
t+1,s − β logLit+1,s, (24)
and
ξt,s =
β2
ν
EtV
1
t+2,s −
β
ν
EtV
1
t+1,s,
and rewrite (23) as
φit,s = ξt,s + κ
i +
β
ν
log
(
wit+1,s
P it+1
)
+ it,s, (25)
where φit,s is the dependent variable constructed from Stage 1 estimates using (24), ξt,s is a time-
skill dummy, κi = − (β/ν) (mi,1 −m1,i) is a country fixed effect, and it,s is the regression residual.
The remaining right hand-side variables are all taken from the data: log
(
wit+1,s/P
i
t+1
)
is the (log)
real wage; log
(
Lit+1
)
is the lead of the (log) population in country i. We estimate (25) as an
IV regression, using two-period lagged values of real wages as instruments similar to Artuc¸ et al.
(2010), and clustering standard errors at the country level.
We build wages, for each country i and year t ∈ [2002− 2009], as the ratio of the economy-wide
“Labour compensation” (in millions of national currency) and “Number of persons engaged” (in
thousands) from the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts (SEA) data set (Timmer et al. (2015b)).
Then, we use the purchasing-power-parity adjusted real exchange rate from version 9.0 of the Penn
World Tables to compare wages across countries and time (Feenstra et al. (2015)). To compute
wages by skill level we resort once again to the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts: The high-skilled
wage is computed by applying the high-skilled share of labor compensation and the high-skilled
share of total hours; we convert hours into persons by assuming that the number of hours per
person does not vary with skills.
Table (D.1) reports the second stage IV estimates for 1/ν for β = 0.97 for the baseline case
and for the extension with public good described below. The estimates for alternative values of
β = {0.90, 0.95} are the same up to the second decimal digit.
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Table D.1: International Migration Elasticity, Second Stage Estimates
Baseline With public good
1/ν
0.44***
(0.13)
0.53***
(0.14)
Obs. 100 100
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the
country-level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01
D.1 Estimation with Public Goods
In section 5.2.1 of the main text we extended our model to account for additional congestion effects
coming from the provision of public goods. It turns out that this extension only slightly modifies the
methodology for the estimation of the international migration elasticity outlined above. The first
stage, based on the migration share equation, is unchanged. The second stage relies on a modified
Bellman equation that includes the per capita provision of public goods
(
Gi/Lit+1
)
, weighted by
the fraction of public goods in total consumption (αi ), as well as wages net of labor income taxes,
β
ν
EtV
i
t+1,s =
β
ν
 αi log
(
Gi/Lit+1
)
+ (1− αi) log
[(
1− τ it+1
) wit+1,s
P it+1
]
+βEtV
i
t+2,s + Ω
i
t+1,s
 .
Following the same steps outlined above for the case without public good, it is easy to obtain the
estimating equation
φit,s = ξt,s + κ
i +
β
ν
{
−αi logLit+1 + (1− αi) log
[(
1− τ it+1
) wit+1,s
P it+1
]}
+ it,s, (26)
where the country fixed effect is now defined as κi = (β/ν)αi logG
i − (β/ν) (mi,1 −m1,i). In
terms of data, we need to compute the fraction of public goods in total consumption αi, which we
construct using the WIOD World Input-Output Database, and we need information on labor income
taxes. In order to compute net real wages we resort to the OECD Tax Database, which provides
data on combined central and sub-central government income tax plus employee social security
contribution, as a percentage of gross wage earnings, for people whose income is 100 percent of
the average wage (OECD (2016)). In the OECD Tax Database the average wage is defined as the
average annual gross wage earnings of adult, full-time, manual and non-manual workers. Data are
available for each year for 14 countries in our sample, all except Lithuania, Latvia and Cyprus. For
these three countries we compute the tax rate as the average of the tax rate for all the other NMS
countries, by year.
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E   Elasticity of Substitution Between Low and High Skilled Workers
In Section 4.5 we provided an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled
workers. To construct the data, we consider all industries in the economy except for agriculture
and fishing, international organizations, and government and justice. We consider all single-job
workers between 18 and 65 years old, working no more than 480 hours per month, earning at least
the minimum wage, excluding apprentices and workers for which no information on education is
available. We trim the top and bottom 1 percent of workers according to the distribution of hourly
wages in each year. We end up with 25.7 millions observations that we aggregate into skill-year
groups to construct hours. To construct the average wage in each cell we use a more selective
sample that includes only employees with a permanent contract, working at least 35 hours per
week. The average weekly wage in a skill-year cell is constructed by using only the base wage, and
then taking the weighted average over workers where the weights are the regular hours worked by
the individual. Wages are deflated to 2005 using Statistics Portugal monthly consumer price index
by special aggregates that we convert to annual. In order to classify workers as “displaced” we
partly follow Carneiro and Portugal (2006) and define a firm as shutting down after year t when
the firm is observed in the Quadros de Pessoal data in year t but is not observed in the dataset
in any of the three subsequent years. If a firm is last active in t we record the total regular hours
worked by its low- and high-skilled workers in t and use these hours to construct the instrument
for t+ 1.58
Table E.1 reports the estimates, which are all significant at 1 percent. Employing the IV
methodology and data outlined above, we obtain an elasticity of 4, which is the number we use in
our quantitative analysis. Our estimate is slightly above those commonly found for the U.S. (Katz
and Murphy (1992); Johnson (1997); Krusell et al. (2000); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Ciccone and
Peri (2005)) which range between 1.5 and 2.5, but below the elasticity of substitution of 5 between
low- and medium-skilled workers found for Germany (Dustmann et al. (2009)). Since the set of
European countries we consider in the quantitative analysis is pretty diverse in terms of labor
market institutions and workforce characteristics we consider our benchmark estimate of 4 as a
good compromise.
The estimate of the elasticity of substitution turns out to be pretty robust to alternative different
specifications, methodologies, and levels of data aggregation. Table E.1 reports an alternative set
of estimates using OLS with linear or spline (with break in 1993) trends, at the industry-region and
country-level. It also reports a set of estimates based on an alternative way to construct the data
series for hours and wages based on Autor et al. (2008). In this case we construct a fix-weighted ratio
of high-skill to low-skill wages for a composition-constant set of sex-education-experience groups.
To do that, we regress monthly deflated wages, for each sex and year, on five education categories
58We construct the lead because the information reported in Quadros de Pessoal is collected in October of every
year from 1994 on (before that it was collected in March).
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Table E.1: Elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skill workers, Portuguese matched
employer-employee data
Industry-region-level Country-level
Country-level
(composition-adjusted)
Elasticity R2 Obs. Elasticity R2 Obs. Elasticity R2 Obs.
IV 4.0 0.84 180
Linear trend 5.2 0.94 210 4.2 0.97 14 3.6 0.97 14
Spline 3.7 0.92 210 3.1 0.98 14 3.0 0.99 14
Note: All estimates are significant at 1 percent. All industry-region-level estimates include industry-region
fixed effects. Industry-region-level OLS estimates include industry-region-specific trends.
(3 years or less, between 4 and 6 years, between 7 and 9 years, between 10 and 12 years, and 13
years and above), a quartic in experience (defined as age minus 6 minus the number of education
years), and all the interactions between the education dummies and the quartic in experience. The
predicted wages for each sex-education-experience-year group are then aggregated at the skill-year
level with a constant set of weights based on the aggregate hours shares of each group. The series
for hours is constructed by aggregating at the skill-year level the series for total regular hours
worked by sex, five education groups and experience. The aggregation employs a series of weights
to turn hours into efficiency units. Weights are constructed by normalizing the predicted wages
described above by the top wage across cells. Estimates for the elasticity of substitution, using
different types of trends turn out to be slightly smaller, but overall pretty similar to all the others.
F Equilibrium Conditions of the Temporary Equilibrium in Changes
In this appendix, we describe the equilibrium conditions of the production structure in relative time
differences. As in the main text, let y˙t+1 ≡ yt+1/yt denote the relative time change of a variable
and by yˆt+1 ≡ y˙′t+1/y˙t+1 the relative time difference of the variable under a sequence of policies
{Υ ′t}∞t=0 relative to the sequence of policies {Υt}∞t=0. Also, let’s define ωs,t = ws,t (rt)γ
i/(1−γi).
The cost of the bundle of inputs and the price index in relative time differences are
xˆit =
ξ′ih,t−1
(
ω˙
′i
h,t
)1−ρ
+ ξ
′i
l,t−1
(
ω˙
′i
l,t
)1−ρ
ξih,t−1
(
ω˙ih,t
)1−ρ
+ ξil,t−1
(
ω˙il,t
)1−ρ

(1−γi)
1−ρ
,
Pˆ it =
(∑N
j=1
pi
′ij
t−1p˙i
ij
t Aˆ
j
t (κˆ
ij
t xˆ
j
t )
−θ
)− 1
θ
,
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while the bilateral expenditure shares in relative time differences are
pˆiijt =
(
κˆijt xˆ
j
t
Pˆ it
)−θ
Aˆjt .
The share of skilled labor in the counterfactual equilibrium is given by
ξi
′
s,t = ξ
i
s,t−1
(
ω˙
′i
s,t
)1−ρ
(
x˙
′i
t
) 1−ρ
1−γi
.
Total expenditure in the counterfactual equilibrium is given by
X
′i
t = Ξ
(
ω˙′h,t
)1−γi (
ξ˙
′i
h,t
)γi (
L˙
′i
h,t
)1−γi
w
′i
h,t−1L
′i
h,t−1+
(
ω˙′l,t
)1−γi (
ξ˙
′i
l,t
)γi (
L˙
′i
l,t
)1−γi
w
′i
l,t−1L
′i
l,t−1+ ι
iχ′t,
with Ξ = 1∑N
j=1
pi
′ij
t
(1+τ
′ij
t )
and χ′t =
∑N
i=1
(
ω˙
′i
h,t
)(
L˙
′i
h,t
ξ˙
′i
h,t
)1−γ
rit−1H i.
Finally, the labor market condition of skilled labor market
ω˙
′i
s,t =
 1(
ξ˙
′i
s,t
)γi (
L˙
′i
s,t
)1−γi
(
(1− γi)ξ′is,t
w
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s,t−1L
′i
s,t−1
∑N
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t X
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t
τ
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t
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1
1−γi
.
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